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Abstract
We study reforms of non-linear income tax systems from a political economy
perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms
so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also
provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the US. We show that
past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by
the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we
develop su cient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits
a politically feasible reform.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a new approach for a political economy analysis of non-linear tax
systems. It develops a theory of tax reforms that are politically feasible in the sense
that a majority of individuals prefers the reform over the status quo. The theory gets
traction from focusing on monotonic tax reforms, i.e. reforms so that changes in the tax
burden are a monotonic function of income. We investigate empirically to what extent
this premise is satisfied in actual tax policy. We also investigate to what extent past
reforms were, through the lens of our framework, politically feasible.
The previous literature has focused on models of voting over tax schedules. The set
of non-linear tax policies is a multi-dimensional policy space. Thus, the median voter’s
preferred policy is not a Condorcet winner. This complicates any analysis of voting over
non-linear tax schedules. One way of dealing with this complication is to restrict attention
to a subset of tax systems for which a median voter theorem applies.1 These restrictions,
however, limit the scope for a comprehensive political economy analysis of top tax rates,
earning subsidies for the “working poor”, or taxes for the middle class.
One advantage of our approach is that restrictions on marginal tax rates are not
needed. Another advantage is that it allows for an easy connection between a normative
perspective and a political economy perspective on tax reforms. Normative analyses fre-
quently analyze the welfare implications of raising or lowering the marginal tax rates in a
narrow bracket of incomes. These tax perturbations satisfy the monotonicity assumption
on which our political economy analysis is based. Thus, we can also analyze whether a
given tax system can be reformed in a way that is both politically feasible and welfare-
improving, or whether the tax system is e cient in the sense that the scope for politically
feasible welfare improvements has been exhausted.
Theorem I: A median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms. Monotonic tax
reforms play an important role both in our theoretical and in our empirical analysis. To
fix ideas, we give two stylized examples of monotonic tax reforms: A reform that involves
tax cuts for all incomes, with larger cuts for larger incomes is a monotonic tax reform.
Another type of monotonic reform is one that involves higher taxes, with increases that
are a larger for “the rich.” Theorem 1 is a median voter result for such tax reforms: a
monotonic tax reform is supported by a majority of the population if and only if the
person with median income is among the beneficiaries.
We prove this result in the context of a basic model of income taxation: individuals
derive utility from consumption and the generation of income requires costly e↵ort. A
non-linear tax system is in place and we analyze whether it can be reformed so that a
1For instance, the well-known prediction due to Meltzer and Richard (1981) that tax rates are an
increasing function of the di↵erence between median and average income is obtained by focusing on linear
income taxes.
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majority of individuals is in favor of the reform. We consider budget-balanced reforms
and assume that changes in tax revenue are rebated lump-sum.2
At the heart of the median voter result is an application of the envelope theorem.
Accordingly, whether a person is beneficiary of a reform depends on how the change in
tax revenue relates to the change in the person’s tax bill. A person benefits if there is a
revenue gain that outweighs higher taxes, or if there is a tax cut that outweighs a loss of
revenue. With a monotonic tax reform, there is a single cuto↵ level of income dividing the
proponents and the opponents of the reform. For instance, with a reform that involves
tax cuts that are larger for richer people and which causes a loss of revenue, individuals
with an income below the cuto↵ are harmed and individuals with an income above the
cuto↵ are made better o↵. In any case, the group that includes the person with median
income forms a majority.
Empirical analysis I. Theorem 1 guides our empirical analysis of tax reforms: we
investigate to what extent past tax reforms were monotonic. We also look into whether
the median voter actually was a beneficiary, and whether there was support for the reform
in the population at large. Ultimately, we check whether majority support and support
by the median voter are not just aligned in theory, but also in the data. To answer these
questions we provide a detailed analysis of the post war federal income tax reforms in
the US, using NBER’s TAXSIM microsimulation model and tax return micro data from
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).3
In studying the extent to which reforms of the federal income tax in the US were
monotonic reforms we take account of the fact that tax reforms often times involved
not only a change of tax rates, but also a change in the definition of the tax base. We
moreover do justice to the fact that several reforms were gradually phased in over several
years. Finally, we document the heterogeneity in the way in which people were a↵ected
by these tax reforms (e.g., depending on the number of kids, marital status, or the mix
between capital and labor income). We find that the tax reforms were, by and large,
monotonic, with monotonic tax cuts – i.e. larger tax cuts for richer taxpayers – being the
most prevalent reform type. There were fewer reforms leading to higher taxes on high
incomes, but those were also broadly monotonic.
We also document that there was substantial individual heterogeneity in the e↵ects
of a tax reform: the correlation between taxpayers’ ranks in the income distribution and
the change of their tax burden is large, but not perfect. These deviations then lead to
the question whether the tax reforms in the US were monotonic enough in the sense of
our theory. The answer is “yes” provided that, for these reforms, support by the median
voter was aligned with majority support in the population at large.
2We discuss extensions of this basic setup in the Online-Appendix.
3We complement this analysis by looking at a large set of tax reforms in OECD countries, and by
looking at various reform proposals that were part of political campaigns in the US, but which were not
enacted.
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In answering this question, we deal with various challenges: for any taxpayer in our
data, we need an assessment of whether or not she was a beneficiary of a reform. Thus,
we develop a measure of the e↵ects of a reform on individual welfare. Using this measure,
we prove a median voter theorem that applies to large reforms, transcending the analysis
of local e↵ects based on the envelope theorem. We address the heterogeneity in the e↵ects
of a reform on people with close to median incomes, which complicates the analysis of
whether “the median voter” gained or lost from a particular reform. Finally, we don’t
observe the taxpayers’ post-reform incomes, complicating the analysis of the behavioral
responses to a reform and of its revenue implications. One of this paper’s contributions
is to outline an approach that deals with all these issues. Its overall logic is to relate an
estimate of the change in total tax revenue to an estimate of how a taxpayer’s specific
tax burden changed.
The estimates of the revenue implications and of the changes of individual tax burdens
that go into this analysis depend on assumptions about the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI). We find that, with an ETI of zero, the reforms involving higher taxes on “the
rich” were both in the interest of the median voter and of a majority of taxpayers. The
reforms involving tax cuts were neither in the median voters’ interest, nor in the interest
of a majority. For the latter type of reform, the overall revenue loss looms substantial
so that only individuals with incomes far above the median benefited. When imputing
larger ETI values, this finding is eventually reversed. The tax cuts then appear to have
been close to self-financing and therefore also in the interest of most taxpayers, including
those with close to median incomes. The reforms involving higher taxes on “the rich”
are diagnosed as aggravating an ine ciency and as being neither in the median voter’s
interest, nor in the interest of a majority of taxpayers.
In any case, we find that majority support goes together with support by the median
voter. This finding does not depend on any specific value of the ETI. If the median voter
liked a reform, so did a majority of taxpayers. If the median voter disliked a reform, then
a majority of taxpayers disliked it. The value of the ETI matters only for which of these
two possibilities actually applies.
For values of the ETI that are considered plausible in the contemporaneous empirical
literature – reviewed in Saez et al. (2012) – the reforms involving monotonic tax cuts
seem to have made both the median voter and a majority of the population worse o↵.
It is interesting to note, however, that much higher values of the ETI were considered
plausible at times when some of the prominent tax cuts were prepared or had already
been enacted; see, in particular, the seminal articles by Feldstein (1995, 1999).
Theorem II: Political feasibility and welfare. In some of our analysis, we focus
on simple reforms. Such a reform involves a small change of the marginal tax rates for
incomes in a narrow bracket. Simple reforms are monotonic so that Theorem 1 applies.
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Moreover, they have welfare implications that are well understood.4 Hence, by focusing
on simple reforms we can provide a more detailed analysis of how the set of politically
feasible reforms relates to the set of welfare-maximizing reforms.5
Theorem 2 provides a characterization: if the status quo is a Pareto-e cient tax
system, tax cuts for below median incomes and tax increases for above median incomes are
politically feasible. If tax rates on high incomes are revenue-maximizing in the status quo,
only tax cuts below the median are politically feasible. An implication of the Theorem is
that a sequence of politically feasible reforms should lead to lower and lower marginal tax
rates below the median and, possibly, to higher and higher marginal tax rates above the
median. Moreover, such a sequence should give rise to an income range with a pronounced
progression of marginal tax rates that connects the low rates below the median with the
high rates above the median.6
As a corollary, Theorem 2 also provides an answer to the question whether a given tax
system can be reformed in way that is both welfare-improving and politically feasible.
If tax rates below the median are too high from a welfare perspective, then tax cuts
are both politically feasible and welfare-improving. If tax rates are too low above the
median, then they can be increased in way that is both politically feasible and welfare-
improving. Otherwise, there is no simple reform that is both welfare-improving and
politically feasible.
Empirical analysis II. We present an empirical analysis that is motivated by Theorem
2. Specifically, we check whether US tax reforms since World War II (WWII) led to lower
marginal tax rates below the median, possibly, in connection with higher marginal tax
rates above the median, and, in any case, more pronounced progression over a range
of middle incomes. We argue that the introduction and the expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) indeed led to lower marginal tax rates for low incomes and
more pronounced progression for incomes not quite as low. There is no move towards
higher tax rates for above median incomes.
To provide a more detailed explanation for these observations, we employ su cient
statistics that enable us to identify politically feasible reforms empirically. We derive
upper and lower Pareto bounds which determine the range over which reforms towards
lower marginal tax rates below the median, or towards higher marginal tax rates above
4See Piketty (1997), Saez (2001), Golosov et al. (2014), or Jacquet and Lehmann (2016).
5A caveat that applies to any approach based on small reforms is that it can only identify directions
for reform. While this is informative, it does not extend without further assumptions to large reforms,
see Kleven (2018). This qualification also applies to Theorem 2 and the subsequent analysis. It identifies
politically feasible reform directions.
6In our empirical analysis we present suggestive evidence of this pattern for the US. In the German
income tax, progression is indeed particularly pronounced for middle incomes, a phenomenon referred
to as the “Mittelstandsbauch” (middle class belly). This is similar in the Netherlands, see Jacobs et al.
(2017).
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the median are politically feasible. How tight these Pareto bounds are depends, again,
on the behavioral responses to taxation, i.e. the ETI.
We then look at past reforms and find that the upper Pareto bound got close to
the status quo schedule for values of this elasticity that are discussed in the empirical
literature. Thus, the discussion about the appropriate value of the ETI has implications
for whether taxes on “the rich” could be increased in a politically feasible way. Low
estimates suggest that the answer is “yes”, high estimates suggest that the answer is
“no.” The lower bound does not give rise to such controversies. It was far away from the
status quo for plausible values of the ETI. Thus, marginal taxes on “the poor” could be
lowered in a politically feasible way. These findings are consistent with the US reforms, as
sketched in the previous paragraph, that is, with the pattern that taxes on the “working
poor” were lowered, whereas taxes on “the rich” were not increased.
Outline. The next section discusses the related literature. The formal framework is
introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the median voter theorem for monotonic
reforms. The characterization of simple reforms that are politically feasible can be found
in Section 5. Section 6 contains the results of our empirical analysis. The last section
contains concluding remarks. Formal proofs are relegated to the Online-Appendix. There
we also discuss extensions of the median voter theorem for monotonic reforms to models
that are richer than our basic setup.7
2 Related literature
Most of the previous literature on the political economy of taxation has focussed on
models of voting over tax schedules. Contributions di↵er in the specification of the policy
domain – e.g. whether taxes are linear or non-linear – and in the specification of the
political economy model, e.g. whether there is party competition as in Downs (1957) or
competition between candidates as in the citizen-candidate framework due to Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Below we explain in more detail
how our work relates to this literature. An advantage of our focus on monotonic tax
reforms is that it allows for a political economy analysis on a domain that is relevant for
optimal non-linear taxation. This allows to analyze the tension between what is welfare-
improving and what is politically feasible. In particular, it connects with the literature
on optimal taxes and/or welfare-improving tax reforms that invokes the perturbation
method. Simple reforms play an important role in this literature. Simple reforms are
monotonic. Hence, our political economy analysis applies to them.
7Specifically, we consider the possibility to mix direct and indirect taxes as in Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) the possibility to add sources of heterogeneity among individuals such as fixed costs of labor
market participation or public goods preferences, and the possibility that taxpayers seek to mitigate
income di↵erences that are due to luck as opposed to e↵ort as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
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Our approach is, moreover, inspired by an older literature in public finance that seeks
to complement the theory of optimal taxation – which characterizes welfare-maximizing
tax systems and has no role for current tax policy – by a theory of incremental changes
that apply to a given status quo, see Feldstein (1976).8 Our analysis goes beyond this
earlier literature by combining results from social choice theory on the validity of median
voter theorems, see in particular Rothstein (1990; 1991), with the perturbation approach
to the analysis of non-linear tax systems; see Piketty (1997), Saez (2001) Golosov et al.
(2014) and Jacquet and Lehmann (2016) for important references.
The seminal contribution on linear income taxation and Downsian competition is
Roberts (1977). This paper is known for a median voter result. Gans and Smart (1996)
note the connection between this result and the more general analysis by Rothstein.
Our work is related in that we also draw on Rothstein’s insight to prove a median voter
theorem, albeit one that applies to tax reforms.9 Median voter results are also established
by Ro¨ell (2012), Bohn and Stuart (2013) and Brett and Weymark (2016; 2017) who study
non-linear taxes in the citizen-candidate framework.10
Median voter theorems for linear income taxation are known for the prediction that
more inequality, measured by the gap between average and median income, leads to more
redistributive taxation, see Meltzer and Richard (1981). The explanatory power of this
framework was found to be limited – see, for instance, the review in Acemoglu et al.
(2015) – and has led to analyses in which the preferences for redistributive tax policies
are also shaped by prospects for upward mobility or a desire for a fair distribution of
incomes.11 In the Online-Appendix, we extend our basic analysis and prove a median
voter theorem for reforms of non-linear tax systems that takes account of such demands
for fairness.
Pareto bounds for non-linear taxes play an important role in our characterization
of politically feasible tax reforms. This links our analysis to work on Pareto-e cient
8Weymark (1981), for instance, studies the scope for Pareto-improving reforms of a commodity tax
system. Guesnerie (1995) provides a survey of this literature and contains an analysis of tax reforms
that emphasizes political economy forces, formalized as a requirement of coalition-proofness.
9Gans and Smart (1996) also show that the median voter result due to Roberts (1977) extends to a set
of non-linear tax systems, namely those that can be ordered according to their degree of progressivity;
among them tax schedules with a constant rate of progressivity, see Heathcote et al. (2017). Be´nabou
(2000) uses this framework for a dynamic political economy analysis of redistributive taxation.
10There are also political economy approaches to non-linear taxation that do not give rise to median
voter results. Non-linear taxation has, for instance, been squared with probabilistic voting, political
agency models, or pork-barrel spending; see Farhi et al. (2012), Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016), Acemoglu
et al. (2008; 2010), or Bierbrauer and Boyer (2016). Saez and Stantcheva (2016) study generalized
welfare functions with weights that may reflect such political equilibrium outcomes. Our approach
di↵ers in that we do not solve for an equilibrium policy in a game of political competition. Instead, we
provide a characterization of a set of politically feasible reforms. The more specific models of political
competition can be used to select an equilibrium policy from this set.
11See, for instance, Piketty (1995), Be´nabou and Ok (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Be´nabou
and Tirole (2006), or Alesina et al. (2018).
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taxation, see Stiglitz (1982), Werning (2007) or Lorenz and Sachs (2016). We complement
this literature by characterizing a lower Pareto bound for marginal tax rates on top of
the classical upper Pareto bound, and we provide an application of these Pareto bounds
to the data.
The empirical analysis in this paper makes use of tax return micro data and of NBER’s
TAXSIM microsimulation model. In terms of research methodology, we build on and
extend work by Eissa et al. (2008) and Bargain et al. (2015). Similar approaches have
also been used for the purpose of ex ante policy evaluation, see Immervoll et al. (2007)
for a prominent example. Our analysis makes use of these tools for a political economy
analysis, and, at the same time, for an analysis of how various aspects of US tax policy
have evolved since WWII.12 Our empirical analysis focusses on questions that have not
been addressed in the previous literature: To what extent are tax reforms monotonic?
To what extent is support by people with close to median income aligned with majority
support in the population? To what extent are lower taxes on “the poor” and higher
taxes on “the rich” politically feasible. Our answers also take account of the behavioral
responses to taxation.
In answering these questions we also extend existing literature on tax reforms in
the US.13 Eissa et al. (2008) analyze four tax reforms of 1986, 1990, 1993 and 2001 using
survey data from Current Population Survey (CPS ) and focus on single mothers. Bargain
et al. (2015) also include the reforms of 1981 and 2003. We complement their analysis
by also investigating the five additional reforms of 1964, 1969, 1978, 2012 and 2017.
3 The model
We study the political economy of tax reforms through the lens of a generic Mirrleesian
model of income taxation: individuals value consumption and the generation of income
requires costly e↵ort. They maximize utility subject to a budget constraint that is shaped
by a non-linear income tax system. We begin with a specification of preferences and then
describe how individual choices as well as measures of tax revenue, welfare and political
support are a↵ected by reforms of the tax system.
12Broadly related, but with a di↵erence in focus, are Piketty and Saez (2007) and Roemer (2011).
Piketty and Saez (2007) analyze changes in the progressivity of the US federal income tax over time.
Roemer (2011) looks at five US tax income reforms (1981, 1986, 1993, 1997, 2001) with data assembled
by Piketty and Saez (2007) and the Tax Policy Center. He focusses on the hypothesis that the tax policy
proposed by leftist and rightist parties has similar implications for the middle class. See, also, Egger et
al. (2019) who analyze the development of labor income in many countries around the world from 1980
to 2007.
13Several policy studies by the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Congressional Budget O ce, or the
Tax Policy Center analyze single reforms – see Appendix H.
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Preferences. There is a continuum of individuals of measure 1. Individuals have a
utility function u that is increasing in private goods consumption, or after-tax income,
c, and decreasing in earnings or pre-tax income y. Individuals di↵er in their willingness
to work harder in exchange for increased consumption. To formalize this we distinguish
di↵erent types of individuals. The set of possible types is denoted by ⌦ with generic
entry !. The utility that an individual with type ! derives from c and y is denoted by
u(c, y,!).14 For ease of exposition, we assume that preferences are quasi-linear in private
goods consumption and that the e↵ort costs are iso-elastic,15
u(c, y,!) = c  1
1 + 1"
⇣ y
!
⌘1+ 1"
.
With this utility function, preferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property.
This implies that higher types choose higher incomes than lower types, and, in particular,
that this ordering does not depend on the tax system. The set ⌦ is taken to be a compact
subset of the non-negative real numbers, ⌦ = [!,!] ⇢ R+. The cross-section distribution
of types in the population is represented by a cumulative distribution function F with
density f . We denote the median of this distribution by !M .
Tax reforms. Individuals are confronted with a predetermined income tax schedule
T0 that assigns a (possibly negative) tax payment T0(y) to every level of pre-tax income
y 2 R+. Individuals with no income receive a transfer equal to c0   0. A reform induces
a new tax schedule T1 that is derived from T0 so that, for any level of pre-tax income y,
T1(y) = T0(y)+ ⌧ h(y), where ⌧ is a scalar and h is a function. We represent a reform by
the pair (⌧, h) where ⌧ measures the size the reform.
A tax reform is said to be monotonic over a range of incomes Y if T1(y) T0(y) = ⌧ h(y)
is a monotonic function for y 2 Y . Given a cross-section distribution of income, we say
that a reform is monotonic above (below) the median if T1   T0 is a monotonic function
for incomes above (below) the median income. As will become clear, monotonicity at
least above or below the median is key for our median voter results.
A reform induces a change in tax revenue denoted by R(⌧, h). For now we assume that
this additional tax revenue is used to increase the basic consumption level c0. Alternative
uses of tax revenue are considered in the Online-Appendix.
Simple reforms. Some of our results follow from looking at a special class of reforms
that we refer to as simple in what follows. Simple reforms play a prominent role in the
literature, see e.g. Saez (2001) and Piketty and Saez (2013). Such a reform involves a
change of marginal tax rates for incomes in a given bracket. More formally, there exists
a threshold level of income ya, so that the new and the old tax schedule coincide for
14The literature often interprets ! as an hourly wage and l = y! as the time that an individual needs
to generate a pre-tax-income of y, see e.g. Mirrlees (1971) or Diamond (1998).
15A generalization that allows for income e↵ects can be found in Bierbrauer and Boyer (2019).
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yc
C1(y)
C0(y)
c0 +R
c0
c0 +R  ⌧ `
ya yb
Figure 1: A simple reform
Figure 1 shows how a simple reform that generates positive tax revenue, R > 0, a↵ects the combinations
of consumption c and earnings y that are available to individuals. Specifically, the figure shows the curves
C0(y) = c0 + y  T0(y) and C1(y) = c0 +R+ y  T0(y)  ⌧h(y). For incomes below ya and above yb the
curves have the same slopes. The basic transfer increases by R so that more consumption is available at
income levels smaller than ya. Less consumption is available at income levels larger than yb: in Figure
1 we assume that, at these income levels, the loss from the additional tax payment ⌧ ` exceeds the
gain from the increase of the basic transfer. Otherwise the reform would be Pareto-improving, leading
to additional consumption at all levels of income. Between ya and yb the increased marginal tax rate
implies that the consumption schedule becomes flatter.
all income levels below the threshold, T0(y) = T1(y) for all y  ya. For incomes in the
bracket, marginal tax rates change by ⌧ . Let ` be the length of the bracket, and yb = ya+`
be the end of the bracket. Then, T 00(y) + ⌧ = T
0
1(y) for all y 2 (ya, yb). For all incomes
above yb, marginal tax rates do not change, so that T 00(y) = T
0
1(y) for all y   yb. Hence,
the function h is such that
h(y) =
8><>:
0, if y  ya ,
y   ya, if ya < y < yb ,
`, if y   yb .
(1)
For reforms of this type we will write (⌧, `, ya) rather than (⌧, h), see Figure 1 for an
illustration.
Notation and terminology. To describe the implications of reforms for measures of
revenue, welfare and political support it proves useful to introduce the following opti-
mization problem: choose y so as to maximize
c0 +R + y   T1(y)  1
1 + 1"
⇣ y
!
⌘1+ 1"
, where T1(y) = T0(y) + ⌧h(y) .
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We assume that this optimization problem has, for each type !, a unique solution that
we denote by y⇤(⌧, h,!). The corresponding level of indirect utility is given by
c0 +R + v(⌧, h,!) ,
where the function v gives indirect utility net of government transfers. We can now
express the reform-induced change in tax revenue as
R(⌧, h) :=
Z !
!
{T1(y⇤(⌧, h,!))  T0(y⇤(0, h,!))}f(!) d! .
We assume that R(·, h) is a di↵erentiable function of ⌧ and denote the derivative by R⌧ .
The reform-induced change in indirect utility for a type ! individual is given by
V (⌧, h,!) := R(⌧, h) + v(⌧, h,!)  v(0, h,!) .
Pareto-improving reforms. A reform (⌧, h) is said to be Pareto-improving if, for all ! 2 ⌦,
V (⌧, h,!)   0, and if this inequality is strict for some ! 2 ⌦.
Welfare-improving reforms. Consider a social welfare functions with welfare weights
g : ! 7! g(!) that are non-increasing. The welfare change that is induced by a reform is
given by
W (⌧, h) :=
Z !
!
g(!) V (⌧, h,!)f(!) d! .
A reform (⌧, h) is said to be welfare-improving if W (⌧, h) > 0.
Political support for reforms. Political support for the reform is measured by the mass
of individuals who are made better o↵ if the initial tax schedule T0 is replaced by T1,
S(⌧, h) :=
Z !
!
1{V (⌧, h,!) > 0}f(!) d! ,
where 1{·} is the indicator function. A reform (⌧, h) is supported by a majority of the
population if S(⌧, h)   12 . We call such reforms politically feasible.
4 Median voter theorems for monotonic reforms
The focus on monotonic reforms enables a characterization of reforms that are politically
feasible. As we show in this section, checking whether or not a reform is supported by
a majority of individuals is, with some qualifications, the same as checking whether or
not the taxpayer with median income is a beneficiary of the reform. We begin with an
analysis of small reforms and turn to large reforms subsequently.
We say that an individual of type ! benefits from small reform if, starting from some
reform intensity ⌧ 0, the reform intensity is increased at the margin, i.e. if
V⌧ (⌧
0, h,!) :=
d
d⌧
V (⌧, h,!) |⌧=⌧ 0 > 0 .
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If this derivative is negative, the individual benefits from a reduction of the reform inten-
sity. For a simple reform, an increase of ⌧ simple means that marginal tax rates in the
given bracket are increased.
Theorem 1 Let h be a monotonic function. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The median voter benefits from a small reform.
2. There is a majority of voters who benefit from a small reform.
The proof in Online-Appendix A makes use of the envelope theorem:16
V⌧ (⌧, h,!) = R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!)) . (2)
For concreteness, consider a reform that involves tax cuts for everybody and that the
cuts for richer people are larger than the ones for poorer people. Also suppose that the
median voter supports the reform; that is, from the median voter’s perspective, the gain
from the tax cut outweighs the loss of tax revenue. For taxpayers with above median
incomes, the gains are even larger. Hence, everyone who is richer than the median will
also support the reform. The same logic applies if the median voters opposes the reform.
Then everyone who is poorer than the median will oppose it too. Thus, support of the
median voter is both necessary and su cient for political feasibility.
The median voter result in Theorem 1 exploits the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing con-
dition.17 In the Online-Appendix we also consider extensions where the Spence-Mirrlees
single crossing condition does not hold.18 In such a setting, the taxpayer with median
income under the initial tax system T0 may be di↵erent from the taxpayer with median
income under the new tax system, T1. The median voter theorem then only holds for
small reforms in a neighborhood of the status quo; that is, such a small reform is polit-
ically feasible if and only if it is in the interest of the taxpayer with median income in
the status quo. Technically, we need to add a qualifications to Theorem 1: it only holds
locally, at ⌧ = 0.
Non-monotonic reforms. Not all conceivable reforms are such that h is monotonic
for all levels of income. The following Proposition gives conditions under which support
of the median voter is a su cient condition for political feasibility.
16The validity of the Envelope Theorem follows from the analysis of Milgrom and Segal (2002). This
theorem does not require di↵erentiability of the status quo schedule T0, the direction of the reform h, or
continuity of the behavioral responses y⇤. It only requires that utility functions satisfy continuity and
di↵erentiability assumptions that are fulfilled in our case.
17A discussion of how the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition relates to single crossing conditions
that are used in social choice theory to prove median voter theorems, see Bierbrauer and Boyer (2019).
18For instance, we consider a setup where individuals di↵er in their variable e↵ort costs as in the
Mirrlees-model and in their fixed costs of labor market participation, as in Saez (2002) or Jacquet et al.
(2013).
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Proposition 1
1. Let h be non-decreasing for y   y⇤(⌧, h,!M). If the median voter benefits from a
small reform with ⌧ < 0, then it is politically feasible.
2. Let h be non-decreasing for y  y⇤(⌧, h,!M). If the poorest voter benefits from a
small reform with ⌧ < 0, then it is politically feasible.
The first part of Proposition 1 covers reforms that are monotonic and involve tax cuts
that are larger for richer individuals. We present empirical examples of tax reforms with
this property below. A way of making sure that such a reform is appealing to a majority
of voters is to have the median voter among the beneficiaries. If, from the median voter’s
perspective, the reduced tax burden outweighs the loss of tax revenue, then everybody
with above median income benefits from the reform.
The second part applies the same logic to tax cuts for low incomes. If the poorest
individuals benefit from a tax cut and h is non-decreasing for below median incomes,
then individuals with incomes closer to the median benefit even more. Individuals with
below median incomes then constitute a majority in favor of the reform. This case
applies, in particular, to reforms so that T1   T0 is negative and decreasing for incomes
below a threshold yˆ, see below for empirical examples. In this case, political feasibility
is ensured by putting the threshold (weakly) above the median, so that everybody with
below median income is a beneficiary of the reform.
Large reforms. The results in Theorem 1 can be easily extended to large reforms. Say
that an individual of type ! benefits from a reform (⌧, h) if V (⌧, h,!) > 0 and note that
the gains or losses from the reform can be written as
V (⌧, h,!) =
R ⌧
0 V⌧ (s, h,!) ds
= R(⌧, h)  R ⌧0 h(y⇤(s, h,!)) ds
=: R(⌧, h) H(⌧, h,!) .
Also note that H(⌧, h, ·) is a monotonic function of ! if h is a monotonic function. Thus,
upon replacing h by H in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Let h be a monotonic function. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The median voter benefits from a reform (⌧, h).
2. The reform (⌧, h) is politically feasible.
Proposition 1 also extends to large reforms with the appropriate qualifications.
In our empirical analysis that is based on Theorem 1 (see Section 6) we investigate
to what extent past reforms were monotonic and also whether the taxpayer with median
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income was a beneficiary of the reform. When bringing the theory to data, we will
make use of the following insight: suppose that the function h is non-decreasing and that
median income y⇤(s, h,!M) is a monotonic function of the reform intensity s.19 Also, for
concreteness, suppose that the reform involves an increase of the marginal tax rate for
the median income. Then, using the shorthand yM1 := y
⇤(⌧, h,!M) for median income
after the reform,
⌧ h(yM1 )  H(⌧, h,!)  ⌧ h(yM0 )
or, equivalently,
T1(y
M
1 )  T0(yM1 )  H(⌧, h,!)  T1(yM0 )  T0(yM0 ) . (3)
As a consequence,
R(⌧, h) 
⇣
T1(yM0 )  T0(yM0 )
⌘
 V (⌧, h,!M)
 R(⌧, h) 
⇣
T1(yM1 )  T0(yM1 )
⌘
.
(4)
Thus, when the median voter experiences an increase of the marginal tax rate, we under-
estimate her utility gain when we compare the overall revenue e↵ect to the change of the
tax burden and thereby take account only of the mechanical e↵ect. By contrast, we over-
estimate her utility gain, when we base the change of her tax burden on the post-reform
income.20 This pattern is reversed when there is a decrease of the marginal tax rate at
the median level of income. In this case,
R(⌧, h) 
⇣
T1(yM1 )  T0(yM1 )
⌘
 V (⌧, h,!M)
 R(⌧, h) 
⇣
T1(yM0 )  T0(yM0 )
⌘
.
(5)
In the light of (4) and (5), a su cient condition under which the median voter is a
beneficiary of a tax reform is
R(⌧, h) max T1(yM1 )  T0(yM1 ), T1(yM0 )  T0(yM0 )   0 . (6)
Analogously, the median voter is worse o↵ if
R(⌧, h) min T1(yM1 )  T0(yM1 ), T1(yM0 )  T0(yM0 ) < 0 . (7)
We will make use of these conditions in our empirical analysis in Section 6 when we check
whether past reforms were in the median voter’s interest.
19Substantively, this requires that there is an unambiguous e↵ect on the marginal tax rate faced by the
median voter, i.e. this tax rate increases or decreases in the reform intensity. The assumption is satisfied
with simple reforms.
20The lower and the upper bound coincide when there are no behavioral responses, so that yM1 = y
M
0 .
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5 Detecting politically feasible reforms
By the median voter theorem, in order to understand whether a given tax system can be
reformed in a politically feasible way, we need to understand whether or not it can be
reformed in a way that makes the voter with median income better o↵. But how do we tell
whether that’s the case? In this section, we focus on simple reforms.21 Theorem 2 below
provides a characterization of the conditions under which such a reform is politically
feasible. Based on this characterization we develop su cient statistics that make it
possible to identify politically feasible reforms empirically. By squaring this approach with
su cient statistics for the welfare implications of reforms, we finally obtain conditions
under which welfare improvements are politically feasible.
5.1 Pareto-e cient tax systems and politically feasible reforms
A tax schedule T0 is Pareto-e cient if there is no Pareto-improving reform. If it is
Pareto-e cient, then for all ya and l,
`   R⌧ (0, `, ya)   0 ,
where R⌧ (0, `, ya) is the marginal change in tax revenue that results as we slightly rise
⌧ above 0, while keeping ya and ` fix. This follows from equations (1) and (2): if we
had R⌧ (0, `, ya) < 0, a small reform (⌧, `, ya) with ⌧ < 0 would be Pareto-improving:
all individuals would benefit from increased transfers and individuals with an income
above ya would, in addition, benefit from a tax cut. With ` < R⌧ (0, `, ya), a small
reform (⌧, `, ya) with ⌧ > 0 would be Pareto-improving. All individuals would benefit
from increased transfers. Individuals with an income above ya would not benefit as much
because of increased marginal tax rates. They would still be net beneficiaries because the
increase of the tax burden was dominated by the increase of transfers. Under a Pareto-
e cient tax system there is no scope for such reforms. We say that T0 is an interior
Pareto-optimum if, for all ya and `,
` > R⌧ (0, `, ya) > 0 .
Theorem 2 Suppose that T0 is an interior Pareto-optimum.
1. For any ya < yM0 , there is a simple reform with ⌧ < 0 that is politically feasible.
2. For any ya > yM0 , there is a simple reform with ⌧ > 0 that is politically feasible.
21Simple reforms induce discontinuities in marginal tax rates. For ease of exposition, the formal proofs
for this section use smooth approximations of simple reforms that avoid these discontinuities. Thereby
we follow Golosov et al. (2014). Working directly with simple reforms is possible and yields the same
conclusions, but at the cost of longer and more detailed derivations, see Bierbrauer and Boyer (2019).
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According to the theorem, one can find a politically feasible reform for any level of income
ya 6= yM0 if the status quo is an interior Pareto optimum. Specifically, reforms that involve
a shift towards lower marginal tax rates for below median incomes and reforms that
involve a shift towards higher marginal tax rates for above median incomes are politically
feasible. A lowering of marginal taxes comes with a loss of tax revenue. For individuals
with incomes above yb = ya + `, the reduction of their tax burden outweighs the loss of
transfer income so that they benefit from such a reform. If yb is smaller than the median
income, this applies to all individuals with an income (weakly) above the median. Hence,
the reform is politically feasible. By the same logic, an increase of marginal taxes for
incomes between ya and yb generates additional tax revenue. If ya is chosen so that
ya   yM0 , only individuals with above median income have to pay higher taxes with the
consequence that all individuals with below median income, and hence a majority, benefit
from the reform.
Proposition 2 below presents su cient statistics that characterize upper and lower
Pareto bounds for marginal tax rates. Given data on the distribution of incomes, the cur-
rent tax system and the behavioral responses to taxation, these su cient statistics provide
an answer to the question, whether the status quo is an interior Pareto-optimum. We can
then apply Theorem 2 to see what types of reforms are politically feasible. Upon combin-
ing these insights with a characterization of welfare-improving reforms we finally obtain
su cient statistics formulas for politically feasible welfare improvements (see Corollary 3
below). Table 1 provides both a preview and a summary of this analysis.
The table refers to three functions that can be used to Diagnose whether marginal
taxes rates in the status quo are ine ciently low or ine ciently high, or whether a change
of marginal tax rates would be politically feasible and/or welfare-improving. Formally,
they are defined by
Dlow(y) :=   F (!0(y))
f(!0(y)) !0(y)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
,
Dup(y) := 1  F (!0(y))
f(!0(y)) !0(y)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
,
and
DW (y) := 1  F (!0(y))
f(!0(y)) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!0(y))) ,
where !0(y) is the type with an income of y in the status quo and G(!0(y)) := E[g(s) |
s   !0(y)] is the average welfare weight associated to individuals with types above !0.
These expressions are related to T
0
0(y)
1 T 00(y) , i.e. to an increasing function of the marginal
tax rate T 00(y). An inequality such as DW (y) > T
0
0(y)
1 T 00(y) indicates that the marginal tax
rate at income level y is below a threshold, and hence that an increase would be welfare-
improving. More generally, an arrow pointing upwards (resp. downwards) indicates
that raising (resp. lowering) marginal tax rates for incomes in a neighborhood of y is
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Pareto-improving, politically feasible, or welfare-improving. The symbol “-” indicates
that changes of marginal tax rates are neither Pareto-improving nor Pareto-damaging.
According to the first line of Table 1, if a tax system is such that the marginal tax
rate at income y exceeds the upper Pareto bound, then lowering marginal tax rates for
incomes in a neighborhood of y is Pareto-improving, welfare-improving, and politically
feasible. Analogously, according to the last line, if tax rates are ine ciently low in the
status quo, then increased rates are Pareto-improving, welfare-improving and politically
feasible. The second and third line consider tax reforms that are not Pareto-improving.
For below median incomes, only tax cuts are politically feasible. If marginal tax rates
are too high according to a given welfare function, then there is scope for a politically
feasible welfare-improvement. Otherwise, there is a conflict between what is politically
feasible and what is desirable from a welfare perspective. For above median incomes,
only higher tax rates are politically feasible. Thus, there is scope for a politically feasible
welfare improvement if and only if moving towards higher rates is also welfare-improving.
Income (y) below median Income (y) above median
Pareto Political Welfare Pareto Political Welfare
T 00(y)
1 T 00(y) > D
up(y) # # # # # #
Dup(y) > T 00(y)1 T 00(y) > D
W (y) - # # - " #
DW (y) > T 00(y)1 T 00(y) > D
low(y) - # " - " "
T 00(y)
1 T 00(y) < D
low(y) " " " " " "
Table 1: Detecting politically feasible and welfare-improving reforms
5.2 Pareto bounds for marginal tax rates
According to the following Proposition 2, if the status quo tax schedule is Pareto-e cient,
then marginal tax rates are bounded from above by an upper Pareto bound and from
below by a lower Pareto bound. Formally, for any income level y0,
Dup(y0)   T
0
0(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
  Dlow(y0) .
Proposition 2 Suppose that income in the status quo !0 : y 7! !0(y)is a strictly mono-
tonic and continuous function.22 Also suppose that income in the status quo satisfies the
first-order conditions of utility-maximization.
22The assumption that income in the status quo is a strictly monotonic function avoids complications
due to bunching. Bunching would arise at points at which marginal tax rates jump upwards. Downward
jumps, by contrast, would give rise to discontinuities in the function y0. Modifying the analysis so as to
allow for these phenomena is not di cult, see Bierbrauer and Boyer (2019). It merely requires additional
case distinctions that we omit here for ease of exposition.
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1. Suppose that the status quo schedule T0 is such that, at income level y0,
T 00(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
> Dup(y0) := 1  F (!0(y
0))
f(!0(y0)) !0(y0)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
, (8)
then there is a simple Pareto-improving reform (⌧, `, y0) that involves a decrease of
the marginal tax rate at y0.
2. Suppose that the status quo schedule T0 is such that, at income level y0,
T 00(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
< Dlow(y0) :=   F (!0(y
0))
f(!0(y0)) !0(y0)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
, (9)
then there is a simple Pareto-improving reform (⌧, `, y0) that involves an increase of
the marginal tax rate at y0.
The upper Pareto bound. The right hand side of equation (8), Dup(y0), is a product
of two terms, an inverse hazard rate and an inverse elasticities term. To see the role that
they play, consider a reform that involves an increase of marginal tax rates for incomes
in a small neighborhood of y0: the inverse hazard rates relates the number of people who
pay higher taxes and show no behavioral response, 1   F (·), to the number of people
who show a behavioral response and choose to earn less, f(·). The smaller this ratio,
the smaller is the revenue e↵ect of the tax reform. The elasticity " measures the size of
this behavioral response. Thus, a larger a behavioral response and a larger hazard rate
make it more di cult to raise revenue with such a simple reform at y0. If these terms
exceed critical values, then there is a loss rather than a gain of revenue. Tax cuts are
then Pareto-improving.
We can relate Proposition 2 also to the tax policy that maximizes tax revenue, or,
equivalently, a Rawlsian social welfare function. As we show in Online-Appendix B, under
such a tax policy,
T 0(yR(!))
1  T 0(yR(!)) =
1  F (!R(y))
f(!R(y)) !R(y)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
. (10)
where yR(!) is the income realized by type ! under the Rawlsian tax policy. Thus, under
the Rawlsian tax policy marginal tax rates are equal to the upper Pareto bound Dup.
The lower Pareto bound. Equation (9) provides a lower bound for marginal tax
rates. Consider a reform that involves an increase of marginal taxes at y0. As we argued
above, the revenue that is thereby raised is larger the larger is the inverse hazard rate
and the smaller is the elasticity ". To be Pareto-improving the revenue e↵ect must be
so strong that even those who are hit hardest by the tax increase are compensated by
the additional transfers that are financed with this revenue. The right hand side of (9),
Dlow(y0), has a negative sign. This shows that such a situation can only occur if the status
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quo involves earning subsides, or, equivalently, negative marginal tax rates. A situation
in which the lower Pareto bound is violated indicates that these subsidies are excessive:
a move towards lower subsidies would then be Pareto-improving.
The smaller the elasticity " the more negative is the right hand side of (9) and the
more di cult it is to have a Pareto-improving tax increase. Thus, a small behavioral
response implies a more permissive Pareto bound: the set of e cient tax policies is larger
in this case.
We have argued above that there is close connection between the upper Pareto bound
and the tax schedule that maximizes a Rawlsian social welfare function. There is an anal-
ogous connection between the lower Pareto bound and the tax schedule that maximizes
the well-being of the richest taxpayer, the maxi-max tax schedule. As we show in part B
of the Online-Appendix, the maxi-max schedule is such that
T 0(yX(!))
1  T 0(yX(!)) =  
F (!X(y))
f(!X(y)) !X(y)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
, (11)
where yX(!) is the income earned by type ! under the maxi-max schedule.
5.3 Politically feasible reforms
According to Theorem 2, tax cuts are political feasible for below median incomes and
tax increases are politically feasible for above median incomes – provided that the status
quo is an interior Pareto optimum. Proposition 2 provides a characterization of Pareto
bounds that make it possible to check whether this condition is fulfilled. The following
Corollary combines these insights and thereby provides a characterization of politically
feasible tax reforms.
Corollary 2 Suppose that income in the status quo is a strictly monotonic and contin-
uous function of !. Also suppose that income in the status quo satisfies the first order
conditions of utility-maximization.
1. Let y0 < yM0 . There is a politically feasible reform, involving a decrease of marginal
tax rate at y0, if T
0
0(y
0)
1 T 00(y0) > D
low(y0).
2. Let y0 > yM0 . There is a politically feasible reform, involving an increase of marginal
tax rate at y0, if T
0
0(y
0)
1 T 00(y0) < D
up(y0).
Corollary 2 involves a discontinuity at the median level of income. Below, tax cuts are
politically feasible. Above, higher taxes are politically feasible. Thus, if the status quo
indeed is an interior Pareto-optimum, a sequence of politically feasible reforms should give
rise to lower and lower tax rates below the median and to higher and higher tax rates
above the median. If the status quo schedule hits the upper bound above the median,
then only a lowering of marginal tax rates below the median is to be expected. There
must also be a transition from the low rates below the median to the high rates above. If
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the tax schedule is continuous, this necessitates pronounced progression at some middle
income range. We get back to these predictions in our empirical analysis.
Brett and Weymark (2016; 2017) provide a characterization of the tax schedule that
the median voter would choose if she could dictate tax policy. Specifically, they show that
the median voter’s preferred schedule coincides with the Rawlsian one for above median
incomes, and with the maxi-max schedule for below median incomes. In between is a
region of transition that gives rise to bunching. As we discussed before, the maxi-max
schedule coincides with the lower Pareto bound and the Rawlsian schedule with the upper
Pareto bound. Thus, outside the bunching region, a politically feasible reform can also
be viewed as one that brings the status quo closer to the median voter’s preferred tax
policy.
5.4 Politically feasible welfare improvements
Diamond (1998)’s formula provides a characterization of a welfare-maximizing tax system:
T 0(yW (!))
1  T 0(yW (!)) =
1  F (!W (y))
f(!W (y)) !W (y)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆ 
1  G(!W (y))  . (12)
where G(!) := E[g(s) | s   !] is the average welfare weight among those with a type
above ! and yW (!) is the income earned by type ! under the welfare-maximizing tax
system. As we show formally in Online-Appendix A, a simple reform is welfare-improving
if it brings marginal tax rates closer to the ones stipulated by Diamond’s formula. To-
gether with Corollary 2 this insight yields a characterization of politically feasible welfare
improvements.
Corollary 3 Suppose that income in the status quo is a strictly monotonic and contin-
uous function of !. Also suppose that income in the status quo satisfies the first order
conditions of utility-maximization.
1. Consider an income level y0 < y0M . Suppose that
T 00(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
> DW (y0) := 1  F (!0(y
0))
f(!0(y0)) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!0(y0))) ,
then a simple reform that leads to lower marginal tax rates at y0 is both politically
feasible and welfare-improving.
2. Consider an income level y0 > y0M . Suppose that T
0
0(y
0)
1 T 00(y0) < D
W (y0) then a simple
reform that leads to higher marginal tax rates at y0 is both politically feasible and
welfare-improving.
Tax cuts are welfare-improving if taxes in the status quo exceed the level stipulated by
Diamond’s formula. The marginal tax rates according to Diamond’s formula lie above the
lower Pareto bound. Thus, for below median incomes, if a tax cut is welfare-improving,
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then it is also politically feasible. This is the first statement in the Corollary. The second
statement applies the same logic to above median incomes. Higher tax rates are welfare-
improving if they fall short of the level prescribed by Diamond’s formula - in which case
they are also below the upper Pareto bound. Consequently, for above median incomes,
welfare-improving tax raises are also politically feasible.
Corollary 3 states su cient conditions for the existence of welfare-improving and po-
litically feasible reforms. This raises the question of necessary conditions. The Corollary
has been derived from focusing on “small” reforms, i.e., on small increases of marginal
tax rates applied to a small range of incomes. The arguments in the Appendix – more
specifically in proof of Proposition 2 and in the derivation of DW – imply that these
conditions are also necessary in the following sense: if either
y0 < y0M and
T 00(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
 DW (y0) ,
or
y0 > y0M and
T 00(y
0)
1  T 00(y0)
  DW (y0) ,
then there is no “small” reform for incomes close to y0 that is both welfare-improving and
politically feasible.23
The analysis suggests that existing tax schedules might be viewed as resulting from
a compromise between concerns for welfare-maximization on the one hand, and concerns
for political support on the other. If the maximization of political support was the only
force in the determination of tax policy, we would expect to see tax rates close to the
revenue-maximizing rate Dup for incomes above the median and negative rates close to
Dlow for incomes below the median. Concerns for welfare dampen these e↵ects. A welfare-
maximizing approach will generally yield higher marginal tax rates for incomes below the
median and lower marginal tax rates for incomes above the median.
Our analysis also raises a question. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) have argued
that, for plausible specifications of welfare weights, existing tax schedules have marginal
tax rates for high incomes that are too low. Corollary 3 shows that an increase of these
tax rates is not only welfare-improving but also politically feasible. Why don’t we see
more reforms that involve higher tax rates for the rich? Proposition 1 provides a possible
answer to this question: reforms that involve tax cuts that are larger for richer taxpayers
may as well prove to be politically feasible.
6 Empirical analysis
In our empirical analysis, we proceed in four steps. First, guided by Theorem 1, we check
to what extent past tax reforms were monotonic. Second, we investigate whether the
23We omit a more formal version of this statement that would require ✏- -arguments.
20
median voter was a beneficiary of these reforms. Moreover, we check whether support of
a reform by the median voter goes together with majority support in the population at
large, i.e. we check whether the “median voter theorem holds in our data.” Third, guided
by Theorem 2, we check whether we can observe a trend towards steeper progressivity
at or below the median. Fourth, we compute upper and lower Pareto bounds which
determine the range over which reforms are politically feasible. Extensive sensitivity
checks are provided in Online-Appendix F.
6.1 Are tax reforms monotonic?
We look at this question from three di↵erent angles. First, we take a broad overview look
at the annual changes of statutory tax rates in 33 OECD countries for the years 2000-
2016. This leads to the conclusion that a large fraction of these “reforms” were monotonic,
but there were exceptions. Second, we take an in-depth look at 11 major reforms of the
federal personal income tax in the US since WWII using tax return micro data and
microsimulation tools. This provides insights on the heterogeneity in the reform induced
change of individual tax burdens accounting not only for statutory tax rate changes but
also changes in the tax base. We find that the rank correlation between individual incomes
and the changes of individual tax burdens is large, but not perfect. Finally, we look at
tax reform proposals that were part of political campaigns, but which were not enacted.
This reinforces the previous conclusion that tax reforms, whether implemented or just
debated, are usually monotonic. The conclusion that tax reforms are, by and large,
monotonic leads to the question whether they are monotonic enough for our theory to
apply, i.e. whether majority support and support by the median voter are aligned. We
get to this question in Section 6.2 below.
6.1.1 Tax reforms in OECD countries
The OECD provides annual data on the statutory tax systems of its member countries.
In particular, for singles without dependents, it documents tax brackets and tax rates
for labor income, see Online-Appendix D for a more detailed description. We use this
information to construct a tax function.24 A reform takes place when this tax function
changes from one year to the next. It is classified as monotonic when the change of the
tax burden is a monotonic function of income.
Table 2 shows that 78% of the reforms in the sample were monotonic.25 The com-
24The OECD also reports personal allowances and tax credits. We incorporate this information.
25Not all countries have a fraction of monotonic reforms close to the average of 78%. For instance,
the fraction of monotonic reforms is much smaller in Israel and Italy, and much larger in Belgium and
Sweden. Summary statistics for all OECD countries can be found in the supplementary material. The
Supplement also reports on findings obtained from additional sources for the US, the UK and France.
The share of monotonic reforms is 80% for the US (1981-2016), 84% for France (1916-2016) and 77% for
the UK (1981-2016).
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Total number of possible reforms (#years*#countries): 528
Total number of reforms: 394
Number of monotonic reforms: 309 (78%)
Number of non-monotonic reforms: 85 (22%)
Table 2: Monotonic tax reforms in a panel of 33 OECD countries (2000-2016).
Table 2 is based on the OECD database (Table I.1. Central government personal income tax rates and
thresholds: accessible on http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I1). See Online-
Appendix D for a list of the countries that we cover.
plementary set includes reforms that are monotonic either above or below the median.
It also includes reforms with non-monotonicities that seem economically negligible. We
provide more specific examples of such reforms in the supplementary material.
6.1.2 Tax reforms in the US
There were 11 major reforms of the US federal personal income tax between 1964 and
2017 – see Online-Appendix H for details. As documented in Table H.1, some of these
reforms were phased in over several years and we account for this in our analysis.
Methodology. Our analysis is based on NBER’s microsimulation model TAXSIM and
(tax return) micro data. Specifically, we use the public use files (IRS-SOI PUF) of tax
return micro data from the Statistics of Income (SOI ) division of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS ). These data include all information reported on tax returns of individuals
(the number of observations varies between 90,000 - 200,000 across years) and are available
bi-annually for the years 1960–1966 and annually for the years 1966–2012.26 We use
TAXSIM to calculate income and payroll taxes as well as tax credits.27
For now, the question is whether tax reforms are monotonic. To answer it in line with
our theory, we construct a (counterfactual) measure of the change in a taxpayer’s tax
burden that is only due to the reform, holding all individual characteristics, including
the person’s income, fixed.28 Take the example of TRA86 which was phased in between
1985 and 1988. Let T0 be the tax system in 1985 and T1 be the tax system in 1988.
26For the years after 2012, we use the uprated data for each year available on the NBER’s server. This
only a↵ects the analysis of TCJA17 which should therefore treated with a bit more caution compared to
the other reforms as our analysis for this reform is not based on the actual tax return micro data as of
2017.
27For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit http://www.nber.org/
taxsim/. To be precise, we use the TAXPUF version of TAXSIM which is designed to run on the
IRS-SOI PUF data.
28For a more extensive discussion of this counterfactual simulation approach, see, e.g., Eissa et al.
(2008) or Bargain et al. (2015).
22
We observe an individual i’s pre-tax income yi0, and all further characteristics relevant to
compute the individual’s tax burden in the year 1985. We then use TAXSIM to calculate
the person’s tax payment T0(yi0).
29 To account for the fact that T1 becomes e↵ective three
years later, we compute an inflation-adjusted version of yi0 that we denote by yˆ
i
0.
30 Our
measure of the reform induced change of the person’s tax burden is then T1(yˆi0)  T0(yi0).
In the literature, this also known as the direct policy e↵ect. To see whether TRA86
was a monotonic tax reform we then rank individuals according to pre-tax income31 and
investigate to what extent tax units with higher incomes experience larger changes of
their tax burden than individuals with lower incomes.
We have to take some modeling choices on the way and follow the literature - especially
Piketty and Saez (2007) and Eissa et al. (2008) in doing so. In our baseline, we determine
a tax unit’s rank in the income distribution based on pre-tax incomes excluding capital
gains as they are not a regular stream of income. For the calculation of tax payments
capital gains are included. For couples filing jointly, we allocate to each spouse 50% of
the couple’s incomes and taxes (“equal-split couples”). We check the sensitivity of our
results with respect to these (and other) choices in Online-Appendix F.
We explore whether tax reforms are monotonic over the whole income distribution,
or possibly only above or below the median. For robustness, we invoke alternative ways
of determining the median in the income distribution. First, there is the median position
in the tax return data we are using. Second, we make a correction for non-filers, i.e. low
income households who do not submit a tax declaration. The median is then poorer than
the one in the data.32 Third, for a political economy analysis, the median income among
voters is relevant. Since richer individuals are more likely to turn out, the median voter
is richer than the median taxpayer in our data.33 Taking account both of non-filers and
of di↵erential turnout brings us coincidentally back to the median position in our data,
i.e. these e↵ects are neutralizing each other.
29We also observe the actual tax payment of the person. It coincides with the calculated tax payment
in more than 99% of the cases, and there is no systematic pattern in the few cases with no coincidence.
30We use the Consumer Price Index research series using current methods (CPI-U-RS) as an uprating
factor to inflate/deflate incomes.
31Our income measure includes all sources of market income which are reported on tax returns, i.e.
wages and salaries; bonuses and exercised stock-options; employer and private pensions; self-employment
income; business income; dividends, interest, and rents; and realized capital gains.
32To give an example, this shifts the median to the 44th percentile in 2016 in the IRS-SOI PUF data.
To be precise, we use data from Piketty and Saez (2007) to assess the share of non-filing tax units: it
varies between 4-8% in the period of our analysis.
33For turnout rates by income we rely on data from the US Census: https://www.census.gov/
topics/public-sector/voting/data/tables.html. This shifts the median to the 57th percentile in
the 2016 IRS-SOI PUF data.
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Results. For each reform, Figure 2 shows, separately for each decile of the income
distribution, the average value of T1(yˆi0)   T0(yi0).34 Of these reforms, seven can be
broadly classified as tax cuts that are larger for richer taxpayers (RA64, RA78, ETRA81,
TRA86, EGTRRA01, JGTRRA03, TCJA17). Three reforms involve higher taxes on
the top decile (OBRA90, OBRA93, ATRA12). TRA69 is a hybrid with tax cuts for the
middle class, and higher taxes at the top and bottom deciles. Broadly speaking, the figure
shows a monotonic pattern, but there are also deviations from monotonicity. ERTA81
has a non-monotonicity for low incomes, but is monotonic above the median. TRA69 is
monotonic below the median. TRA86 and OBRA90 have non-monotonicities both below
and above the median.
Figure 3 provides additional information on the underlying heterogeneity by means of
box plots. Several insights can be taken away form this. First, looking at the monotonicity
of decile medians gives a similar picture as looking at the monotonicity of decile averages:
by and large, the changes are monotonic. Second, there is significant heterogeneity,
despite this general pattern and non-monotonicities can be found all over the place. To
see this, pick a reform and consider a pair of neighboring deciles: The minimum in
the lower decile is usually lower than the minimum in the next higher decile, but not
lower than the maximum. Still, the overall (rank) correlation is high for all reforms (see
Table F.1 in the Online-Appendix) but the ultimate question is whether there is enough
monotonicity for our theory to apply, i.e. so that support by the median voter is aligned
with support in the population at large. We get to this question below. Third, for the
reforms that involve higher taxes on the rich, the box plots make apparent that only a
very small group of taxpayers was actually hit by higher taxes. For OBRA90, OBRA93
and ATRA12, the top ten percent pay higher taxes on average as shown by Figure 2, but
the box plots reveal that most taxpayers in this decile still experienced a tax cut.
6.1.3 Reform proposals
Does the finding that tax reforms are, by and large, monotonic, extend to tax reforms
proposals which are publicly debated, but not enacted? Providing an answer faces the
challenge that such reform proposals often remain vague, so that researchers have to
make assumptions on the missing details.35 To avoid own judgment calls, we invoke the
systematic analysis of reform proposals in the US that is provided by the Tax Policy
Center. Their analysis covers 69 reform proposals for the Federal personal income tax
that were made in the period 2003-2019: some proposals were made during presidential
34To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the choices made, we replicate Figure 2 in
Online-Appendix F using (i) tax units (instead of equal split couple, see Figure F.1); (ii) statutory tax
rates (instead of e↵ective tax rates, see Figure F.2); (iii) di↵erent bin sizes (50 instead of 10, see Figure
F.3); (iv) di↵erent income definitions: gross income including capital gains (see Figure F.4) and adjusted
gross income (see Figure F.5); and (v) including state-level and payroll taxes (see Figure F.6). Results
are robust across di↵erent specifications and the most noticeable changes a↵ect the three oldest reforms.
35The Netherlands are a notable exception, see Jacobs et al. (2017)
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 2: Changes in tax liability: Average values per decile
Notes: Figure 2 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income
decile. The red line represents a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. Deciles are
computed based on pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains.
All computations are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is
allocated equally to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
,
income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The
vertical lines show di↵erent locations for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes
non-filers to the tax return data while the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential
turnout by income. The solid line in the middle represents both the original median in the data
as well as the one accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 3: Changes in tax liability: Heterogeneity within deciles
Notes: Figure 3 illustrates, for each decile, the cross-sectional distribution of the counterfactual
change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
    T0  yi0  for reforms of the US federal personal income tax
(see Table H.1 for details) by means of a box plot. Deciles are computed based on pre-tax
income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the
individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse.
In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to
year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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campaigns and primaries, others were proposed by the Administration during the legisla-
tive process. The methodology and data used are described in the Tax Policy Center’s
documentation, see also Online-Appendix G for details. Figure 4 illustrates the results
for four proposals made during the 2016 Presidential campaign. Note that the Tax Policy
Center’s analysis provides only information for quintile and not deciles. The proposals
by the two Democratic candidates were of the “tax increase on the rich”-type while the
Republican proposals were of the “tax cuts for everybody”-type. Figures G.1 – G.8 and
Tables G.1 – G.8 in Online-Appendix G summarize our findings for all 69 proposals: the
large majority of tax reform proposals are monotonic. The two reform types observed
during the 2016 Presidential campaign are prevalent with the qualification that the “tax
increase on the rich”-type is often combined with tax cuts for low incomes.36
Figure 4: Changes in tax liability by quintile, 2016 US Presidential campaign
Notes: Figure 4 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals made during the 2016 Presidential campaign for the US federal
personal income tax by income quintile. The first column shows the overall counterfactual tax
change. The data is taking from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal
(see Figure G.1 and Table G.1 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
36The exceptions are proposals made by Cain (Presidential campaign 2012, see Figure G.2), Bowles-
Simpson Plans (bipartisan Presidential Commission created in 2010, see Figure G.4) and the Working
Families Tax Relief Act (a 2019 proposal initiated by Democratic Senators, see Figure G.4).
27
Summary. Our analysis of reforms of the federal income tax in the US and the analysis
of tax reforms in OECD countries in the Supplementary Material show that two types
of tax reforms are particularly frequent: First, reforms that involve monotonic tax cuts,
i.e. tax cuts which are larger for higher incomes. Second, reforms that lead to higher taxes
on high incomes, possibly in combination with tax cuts for low incomes. In the latter
case, monotonicity holds only above or below the median. In the US, the monotonic
tax cuts are more prevalent for the reforms of the federal income tax after WWII. Fewer
reforms led to higher taxes on top incomes.
6.2 Did the median voter gain? Was there majority support?
We return to the reforms of the US federal income tax after WWII. We first analyze
whether the median voter was a beneficiary of these reforms.
Inequality (6) provides a su cient condition under which the median voter gains from
a reform. Remember that the condition relates the change in overall tax revenue to the
change in the median voter’s tax burden, both according to the pre-reform income and
according to the post-reform income. The median voter is better o↵ if there is a loss
of overall revenue and her tax cut is even larger, or if there is a revenue gain exceeding
the increase of her tax bill.37 We extend this analysis to see whether there was majority
support for tax reforms. Any taxpayer i in our data is a reform beneficiary if
R(⌧, h) max T1(yi1)  T0(yi1), T1(yi0)  T0(yi0)   0 . (13)
Thus, there is majority support for a reform if this inequality holds for at least half of
the population.
A detailed explanation of how we bring inequalities (6) and (13) to the data can be
found in Online-Appendix C. Assumptions about the ETI play a role for our estimate
of the revenue e↵ect, R(⌧, h). For large elasticities, the revenue gains from higher taxes
and the revenue losses from reduced taxes appear small. The pattern is reversed for low
elasticities. We also simulate counterfactual post-reform incomes for individuals in our
data set, again using assumptions about the ETI.
Benchmark: ETI of zero. If there are no behavioral responses to taxation, inequality
(13) simplifies. In this case, an individual i gains from a tax reform if the revenue e↵ect
R(⌧, h) exceeds T1(yi0)  T0(yi0), where yi0 is the individual’s pre-reform income, and loses
otherwise.
Figure 5 is an adaptation of Figure 2 above. Recall that the latter shows, for each
decile, the average value of T1(yˆi0)   T0(yi0). Figure 5 now shows, again for each decile,
37As discussed in Section 4, with these conditions we can remain agnostic on whether the median
voter’s marginal tax rate increased or decreased. In Section 6.1.2 we documented that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the e↵ects of a reform. Thus, an advantage of our approach is that it does not require
a specific assumption on the change of marginal tax rates for close to median incomes.
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T1(yˆi0) T0(yi0) R(⌧, h), where R(⌧, h) is calculated assuming an ETI of zero (blue dots).
Thus, positive values in Figure 5 indicate an overall loss, an increase of the tax burden
that is not compensated by the revenue implications of the reform. Negative values, by
contrast, correspond to an overall gain, i.e. a reduction in tax payments.
Some of these reforms appear to be perfectly in line with our theory. For instance,
RA78 is a monotonic reform with tax cuts above the median, and the median being
among the beneficiaries. OBRA90, OBRA93 and ATRA12 have higher taxes on the rich
so that the bottom 90 percent and hence also the median are made better o↵. Other
reforms with, by and large, monotonic tax cuts (RA64, ERTA81,TRA86, EGTRRA01,
JGTRRA03, TCJA17) are qualitatively similar to RA78, but, for an ETI of zero, do not
include the median voter in the set of reform winners. For TRA69, depending on the
exact definition of the median voter, the median voter either gains from the reform, or is
close to being indi↵erent.
Alternative assumptions on the ETI. Figure 5 also shows that alternative assump-
tions about the ETI a↵ect who was a reform winner, or a reform loser, and hence also
whether the median voter was a beneficiary. The reforms involving tax cuts were in the
median voter’s interest for high values of the ETI, but not for low ones. By contrast, the
reforms involving higher taxes on “the rich” were in the median voter’s interest for low
values of the ETI, but not for high ones.
We have seen before that there is substantial heterogeneity in the way in which in-
dividuals were a↵ected by a tax reform. Figure E.2 in the Online-Appendix therefore
supplements Figure 5 by showing, for each decile, the fractions of winners and losers,
respectively. The Figure shows that support for tax cuts gets larger with income, and
that, for an ETI of zero, there are only few supporters with close to median income. The
reforms involving higher taxes on high incomes, by contrast, receive more support than
opposition.
Majority support and support by the median voter. According to Theorem 1,
for monotonic tax reforms, there is an equivalence of support by the person with median
income and majority support. We have seen in Section 6.1 that tax reforms are broadly
monotonic. We also saw, however, that numerous deviations from this broad pattern can
be found. This raises the question whether there is enough monotonicity for our theory
to apply. To provide an answer, we check whether majority support and support by the
median voter are aligned. If this is indeed the case, majority support fails whenever the
median voter is made worse o↵ by a reform, and majority support holds, whenever the
median voter is made better o↵.
As explained above, whether the median voter, or any other person, gained depends
on the ETI. Figure 6 therefore shows majority support and support by voters with close
to median income for di↵erent values of the ETI. Specifically, the vertical axis measures
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 5: Winners and losers of major US tax reforms
Notes: Figure 5 shows the average of the counterfactual change in tax liability
max
 
T1(yi1)  T0(yi1), T1(yi0)  T0(yi0)
  R(⌧, h) for reforms of the US federal personal income
tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income decile for four di↵erent ETI values: 0 (blue), 0.25 (red),
1 (green) and 1.5 (yellow). Deciles are computed based on pre-tax income without capital gains
while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the individual level. For this,
the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to simulate
counterfactual tax payments, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS
deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show di↵erent locations for the median voter: the
dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the tax return data while the dashed line to the right
accounts for di↵erential turnout by income. The solid line in the middle represents both the
original median in the data as well as the one accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
See Figure E.1 in the Online-Appendix for the cross-sectional heterogeneity within each decile.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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support in the population at large and the horizontal axis measures support by people
with close to median incomes (more precisely the average of percentiles P45-P55, i.e. the
range in which the di↵erent median definitions fall). Points in the upper right quadrant
indicate that there was both majority support and support by most people with close to
median income. Points in the lower left quadrant indicate that there was no majority
support and that most people with close to median income opposed the reform. Thus,
points in the upper right quadrant and in the lower left quadrant are in line with the
median voter theorem. By contrast, points in the lower right quadrant and in the upper
left quadrant indicate a discrepancy between support by the median voter and majority
support. The figure reveals that, whatever our assumption on the ETI, majority support
and support by people with close to median incomes are aligned. We hence conclude that
reforms in the US were “su ciently monotonic” and that the “median voter theorem
holds in the data.”
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 6: Majority support versus support by the median voter
Notes: Figure 6 shows the shares of reform winners, i.e. of tax units i with
max
 
T1(yi1)  T0(yi1), T1(yi0)  T0(yi0)
   R(⌧, h)  0 for the full population (vertical axis)
and the middle of the distribution (average of P45-P55, horizontal axis) for major reforms of
the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) and for four di↵erent ETI values
(see Figure 5): 0 (blue), 0.25 (red), 1 (green) and 1.5 (yellow). Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to
each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are
inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. See Figure E.2 and Figure
E.3 in the Online-Appendix for the shares of winners in all income deciles.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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6.3 Increased progressivity in the middle?
Theorem 2 implies that a sequence of politically feasible tax reforms should push tax
rates in the direction of the lower Pareto bound for below median incomes and, possibly,
in the direction of the upper Pareto bound for above median incomes. Mechanically, this
should lead to more pronounced progression over an intermediate range of incomes.
To check whether we can find this pattern in our data for the US, we document the
evolution of e↵ective marginal tax rates T 0 in Figure 7 by plotting the pre- and the post-
reform values of the ratio T
0
1 T 0 .
38 The transition from RA64 to ATRA12 reveals that there
was indeed a lowering of marginal tax rates for low incomes and increased progression for
incomes that were somewhat higher. These changes are associated with the introduction
and then the expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC ). The EITC led to lower,
in fact negative, marginal tax rates for the working poor. Low-income households with
children were the main recipients of these earnings subsidies. The negative marginal tax
rates were phased out over a range of higher incomes, beginning with the income level
qualifying for the maximal credit. This led to a strong increase of marginal tax rates in
the next higher segment of the income distribution.
In contrast, Figure 7 does not reveal a strong tendency towards higher marginal tax
rates above the median. The su cient statistics that we present in the subsequent Section
6.4 provide a possible explanation: the conclusion that there was room to lower marginal
tax rates for “the poor”, is robust to alternative assumptions about the ETI. This is not
true for higher taxes on “the rich.” With an ETI around 1, which has been considered
plausible by scholars in the 1990s (see, in particular, Feldstein, 1995, 1999), such tax
increases appear Pareto-damaging.
38We focus on the ratio T
0
1 T 0 for consistency with the other figures that we present. Figure E.4 in the
Online-Appendix shows T 0 directly.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 7: T
0
1 T 0 by decile before and after each reform
Notes: Figure 7 shows, separately for each decile, the ratio T
0
1 T 0 based on e↵ective marginal
tax rates (EMTRs) before (blue) and after (red) major reforms of the US federal personal
income tax (see Table H.1 for details). Deciles are computed based on pre-tax income without
capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the individual
level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order
to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1
using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show di↵erent locations for
the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the tax return data while
the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income. The solid line in the
middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one accounting for both
modifications simultaneously. See Figure E.4 for EMTRs T 0.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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6.4 Su cient statistics for politically feasible and/or welfare
improving reforms
In the following, we present an analysis of tax reforms using the upper Pareto bound Dup
and the lower Pareto bound Dlow. We will focus on whether the tax reforms in the US
were Pareto-improving or politically feasible. In our data we observe the endogenous (to
the tax system) distribution of incomes (instead of the exogenous distribution of types).39
We therefore use a representation of Dup and Dlow that invokes the income distribution,
as represented by the cdf Fy and the density fy:40
Dlow(y) :=   Fy(y0(!))
fy(y0(!)) y0(!)
1
"
, and Dup(y) := 1  Fy(y0(!))
fy(y0(!)) y0(!)
1
"
. (16)
Upper Pareto bound. Figure 8 shows, for each reform of the US federal income tax,
and each level of income y, the upper Pareto bound Dup(y), the pre-reform value of T 0(y)1 T 0(y)
(in blue) and the post-reform value (in red). The first four reforms (RA64, TRA69, RA78,
ERTA81) involved tax cuts that were larger for richer taxpayers. For plausible values of
the ETI, these reforms can be viewed as responses to ine ciently high tax rates on “the
rich”: For values of the ETI above 0.4, the pre-reform schedule crossed the upper Pareto
bound. The fifth reform (TRA86) again involved tax cuts. Those can be rationalized as
being Pareto-improving for an ETI above 0.5, but not for lower values of the ETI. The tax
cuts in the early 2000s (EGTRRA01, JGTRRA03) and the Trump tax plan (TCJA17)
are Pareto-improving for an ETI above 0.75, but not otherwise. The reforms involving
higher taxes on the rich (OBRA90, OBRA93, ATRA12) appear politically feasible for
ETI values below 0.75. For higher values of the ETI, the reforms led to ine ciently high
tax rates.
Thus, whether higher taxes on the rich were politically feasible depends on the ETI.
With an ETI of 1 or higher, as suggested e.g. by Feldstein (1995, 1999) or more recently by
Mertens and Olea (2018), higher taxes on “the rich” were Pareto-damaging and therefore
not politically feasible. With an ETI around 0.25 as suggested by some of the subsequent
39The idea of identifying types by their position in the income distribution is due to Saez (2001).
40The characterization of Dup and Dlow in Proposition 2 refers to the distribution of types F , with
density f . These distributions are related to each other via
Fy(y) = F (!0(y)) and fy(y) = f(!0(y))
@!0(y)
@y
. (14)
Moreover, for a piecewise linear tax system, i.e. one with T 00(y) = 0, the first order conditions charac-
terizing the function y0 : ! ! y0(!) that gives incomes in the status quo, and its inverse !0 : y 7! !0(y),
imply that✓
1 +
1
"
◆
@!0(y)
@y
1
!0(y)
=
1
y0(!)
1
"
. (15)
Using Proposition 2, (14) and (15) yields 16.
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literature, see Saez et al. (2012) for a survey and Neisser (2017) for a meta-study, higher
taxes on the rich have been politically feasible from the mid 80s onward.
Lower Pareto bound. Figure 9 shows, for each reform of the US federal income tax,
and each level of income y, the lower Pareto bound Dlow(y), and, again, the pre-reform
value (in blue) and the post-reform value (in red) of T
0(y)
1 T 0(y) . All reforms give rise to
the same conclusion: the lower bound came nowhere close to the pre- or the post-reform
schedule. Hence, lower tax rates for “the poor” were politically feasible. The introduction
and subsequent expansion of the EITC from the mid 1970s onward went in this direction.
It lowered marginal tax rates, predominantly, for low income households with children.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 8: Upper Pareto bounds Dup
Notes: Figure 8 shows the ratio T
0
1 T 0 of the e↵ective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) before (solid
blue line; blue lines in short dashes represent, for each income level, the 10th and the 90th
percentiles of the EMTR function) and after (solid red line) major reforms of the US federal
personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) as well as upper Pareto bounds Dup (dashed
lines) for five di↵erent ETI values: 0.25 (khaki), 0.4 (lavender), 0.5 (cranberry), 0.75 (teal), 1
(orange) and 1.25 (green). Deciles are computed based on pre-tax income without capital gains
while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the individual level. For this,
the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to simulate
counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-
U-RS deflator as uprating factor. Vertical dashed lines show di↵erent percentiles of the income
distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure 9: Lower Pareto bounds Dlow
Notes: Figure 9 shows the ratio T
0
1 T 0 of the e↵ective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) before (solid
blue line; blue lines in short dashes represent, for each income level, the 10th and the 90th
percentiles of the EMTR function) major reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see
Table H.1 for details) as well as lower Pareto bounds Dlow (dashed lines) for four di↵erent ETI
values: 5 (cranberry), 4 (teal), 3 (orange) and 2 (green). Deciles are computed based on pre-tax
income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the
individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse.
In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to
year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. Vertical dashed lines show di↵erent
percentiles of the income distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a theory of politically feasible tax reforms, i.e. of reforms that are
preferred by a majority of citizens over some predetermined status quo in tax policy. We
also present an empirical analysis of tax reforms that is guided by this theory.
The theoretical analysis rests on the assumption that the reform-induced change in
the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. With this assumption we can establish
a median voter theorem for reforms of non-linear tax systems. Accordingly, a reform is
politically feasible if and only if it is preferred by the person with median income. We
also clarify the conditions under which a change of the marginal tax rates for incomes in
a certain range – such as higher taxes on “the rich” or larger earnings subsidies for “the
poor” – are politically feasible.
Our empirical analysis focuses on reforms of the US federal income tax after WWII,
makes use of tax return micro data and NBER’s TAXSIM microsimulation model. Even
though there is heterogeneity in the e↵ects of a tax reform on taxpayers, we find that ac-
tual tax reforms, by and large, satisfy the monotonicity property on which our theoretical
analysis is based. We also find that tax reforms often look as if their had been a deliberate
e↵ort to include people with close to median income into the set of beneficiaries.
Finally, we derive su cient statistics that make it possible to identify politically fea-
sible reforms, given data on the distribution of incomes and the behavioral responses to
taxation. Future research might use this framework to complement existing studies on
the history of income taxation.41
The analysis in the main text is based on the workhorse of analyses of non-linear
taxation, the Mirrleesian model. In the Online-Appendix, we present extensions to richer
models of taxation, such as models with variable and fixed costs of labor market partic-
ipation, models that include heterogeneity in preferences over public goods, or models
that include an investment in human capital. In the main text, we also assume that the
revenue that is generated by a tax reform is rebated lump-sum. In the Online-Appendix,
we also consider that additional revenue from income taxation is used to finance public
goods, or to lower other taxes, e.g. indirect taxes or taxes on capital income. We show
that versions of our median voter theorem for tax reforms also hold in these settings.42
Real-world tax reforms often have revenue implications that are not felt in the same
period in which tax rates change. For instance, tax cuts may yield budget deficits that
41For instance, Scheve and Stasavage (2016) study whether tax systems have become more progressive
in response to increases in inequality or in response to extensions of the franchise. Their analysis compares
tax policies that have been adopted at di↵erent points in time, or by countries with di↵erent institutions.
It does not include an analysis of the reforms that appear to have been politically feasible or welfare-
improving in a given year, for a given country, and a given status quo tax schedule. The framework that
is developed in this paper lends itself to such an analysis.
42A restriction that is needed in these richer models is that reforms are small, so that the people with
close to median income in the status quo are also people with close to median income after the reform.
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necessitate an adjustment of public spending in later periods. Our analysis is based
on a static model, and a formal treatment of the dynamic e↵ets of tax reforms is an
important topic for future research. Still, we provide some tentative remarks on how our
framework might be extended: The important assumption in our baseline analysis is that
the revenue implications of a reform a↵ect all taxpayers similarly, whereas the change of
the tax schedule a↵ects people depending on their incomes. Thus, a scenario in which
spending cuts in later periods hit all taxpayers in a similar fashion, should give rise to
similar conclusions as our baseline analysis. A scenario where future tax cuts hit some
people more than others should correspond to our extension in the Online-Appendix in
which additional tax revenues are spent on public goods and preferences for public goods
are heterogeneous. Thus, we conjecture that our main conclusions extend to environments
with explicit dynamics or uncertainty.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1. By the envelope theorem
V⌧ (⌧, h,!) = R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!)) , (A.1)
where R⌧ (⌧, h,!) is the derivative of tax revenue with respect to ⌧ > 0. The validity of
the envelope theorem follows from Corollary 4 in Milgrom and Segal (2002).
Step 2. Suppose that h is a non-decreasing function. An analogous argument applies if
h is non-increasing. We show that V⌧ (⌧, h,!M) > 0 implies V⌧ (⌧, h,!) > 0 for a majority
of individuals. By Step 1, V⌧ (⌧, h,!M) > 0 holds i↵ R⌧ (0, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!M)) > 0. As h
and y⇤(⌧, h, ·) are non-decreasing functions, this implies R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!)) > 0, for
all !  !M , and hence V⌧ (⌧, h,!) > 0 for all !  !M .
Step 3. Suppose that h is a non-decreasing function. An analogous argument applies if
h is non-increasing. We show that V⌧ (⌧, h,!M)  0 implies V⌧ (⌧, h,!)  0 for a majority
of individuals. By Step 1, V⌧ (⌧, h,!M)  0 holds i↵ R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!M))  0. As h
and y⇤(⌧, h, ·) are non-decreasing functions, this implies R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!))  0, for
all !   !M , and hence V⌧ (⌧, h,!)  0 for all !   !M .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the first statement in the Proposition, let
V⌧ (⌧, h,!
M) = R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!M)) < 0 ,
so that the median voter benefits from a small decrease of tax rate ⌧ < 0. With h
non-decreasing for y   y⇤(⌧, h,!M), this implies that
V⌧ (⌧, h,!) = R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y⇤(⌧, h,!) < 0 ,
for all !   !M . Hence a majority of the population benefits from the tax cut.
The second statement in the Proposition follows from the same argument: If the
poorest individual benefits from a tax cut and individuals with incomes closer to the me-
dian also benefit as h is non-decreasing for below median incomes, then there is majority
support for the reform.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
For a simple reform (⌧, `, ya) the envelope theorem implies that
V⌧ (0, `, ya,!) = R⌧ (0, `, ya)  h(y⇤(0, `, ya,!)) . (A.2)
To prove the first statement in Theorem 2, suppose that ya < y0M = y⇤(0, `, ya,!M).
Choose ` so that ya + ` < y0M . Then h(y⇤(0, `, ya,!)) = `, for all !   !M . Since
2
R⌧ (0, `, ya) < `, it follows that V⌧ (0, `, ya,!) < 0, for all !   !M , which implies that a
small tax cut, ⌧ < 0, makes a majority of individuals better o↵. To prove the second
statement, suppose that ya > y0M . Then h(y⇤(0, `, ya,!)) = 0, for all !  !M . Hence, if
R⌧ (0, `, ya) > 0, then V⌧ (0, `, ya,!) > 0, for all !  !M , which implies that a small raise
of marginal tax rate, ⌧ > 0 , makes a majority of individuals better o↵.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Preliminaries. Let T1 = T0 + ⌧ h. We consider a perturbation that a↵ects marginal
tax rates in a bracket that starts at income level ya and has length `. The function
h : (y, `) 7! h(y, `) is assumed to have the following properties, for any given `:
(i) It is a continuously di↵erentiable and non-decreasing function of y.
(ii) h(y, `) = 0, all y  ya.
(iii) h(y, `) = `, for all y   ya + `.
(iv) hy(y, `) = 1 for y 2 [ya + ✏ `, ya + (1  ✏)`], where ✏ > 0 is a fixed parameter.
(v) hy(y, `) > 0 for y 2 (ya, ya + `).
Note that T 01(y) = T
0
0(y) + ⌧ hy(y, l). Thus, marginal tax rates change by ⌧ hy(y, l),
and this change is di↵erent from zero only for incomes in the bracket. There, they
change by ⌧ , except for incomes in the neighborhood of the bracket’s endpoints. In these
neighborhoods the changes of marginal tax rates are, respectively, phased in and phased
out in a smooth way. We continue to summarize such a reform by the triple (⌧, `, ya)
We first analyze how tax revenue is a↵ected by a simple reform and then turn to the
proof of statements (1.) and (2.) in Proposition 2.
Tax revenue. The additional tax revenue that is generated by a reform (⌧, `, ya) is
given by
R(⌧, `, ya) :=
Z !
!
⇣
T1(y
⇤(⌧, `, ya,!))  T0(y0(!))
⌘
f(!) d! ,
where y0(!) := y⇤(0, `, ya,!) is a shorthand for the income of type ! in the status quo.
We are interested in clarifying the conditions under which a small tax cut raises revenue,
i.e. the conditions under which R⌧ (0, `, ya) < 0 holds, for some level of income ya and
some ` > 0.
Let !a(⌧, `, ya) be the smallest type with an income larger or equal to ya given a reform
(⌧, `, ya). Likewise let !b(⌧, `, ya) be the largest type with an income below yb = ya+ `. In
the absence of income e↵ects, the reform does not a↵ect the behavior of individuals with
earnings below ya or above yb. For these individuals, marginal tax rates do not change.
Since h(y) = 0, for y  ya, there is also no e↵ect on the tax liability of individuals with
3
earnings below ya. By contrast, the tax liability of individuals with earnings above yb
increase by ⌧ `. Thus, we can write
R(⌧, `, ya) =
!b(⌧,`,ya)R
!a(⌧,`,ya)
⇣
T0(y⇤(⌧, `, ya,!)) + ⌧ h(y⇤(⌧, `, ya,!))  T0(y0(!))
⌘
f(!)d!
+ ⌧ `
⇣
1  F (!b(⌧, `, ya))
⌘
.
(A.3)
Computing the derivative with respect to ⌧ , using Leibnitz’ rule, and evaluating at ⌧ = 0
yields
R⌧ (0, `, ya) =
!0(ya+`)R
!0(ya)
⇣
T 00(y0(!)) y0⌧ (!) + h(y0(!))
⌘
f(!)d!
+ `
⇣
1  F (!0(ya + `))
⌘
,
(A.4)
where y0⌧ (!) := y⇤⌧ (⌧, `, ya,!) |⌧=0 is the derivative of y⇤ with respect to ⌧ , evaluated at
the status quo, i.e. for ⌧ = 0.
The assumption that income in the status quo is a continuous function of ! plays a
role in the derivation of equation (A.4): A change of ⌧ implies a change of !b(⌧, `, ya)
which enters both as the upper limit of the integral in the first line of (A.3) and via the
term in second line of (A.3). These marginal e↵ects exactly cancel at ⌧ = 0 if the function
y0 is continuous.
Computing the derivative of R⌧ (0, `, ya) with respect to ` and evaluating at ` = 0
yields
R⌧`(0, 0, ya) = T 00(ya) y0⌧ (!0(ya)) f(!0(ya)) !0`(ya) + 1  F (!0(ya)) ,
where !0`(ya) :=
d
d` !0(ya + `) |`=0 . Note that !0(ya + l) solves ya + l = y0(!0(ya + l)).
Hence, !0`(ya) = y0!(!0(ya)) 1, where, for any !0, y0!(!0) := y⇤!(⌧, `, ya,!) |⌧=0,!=!0 .
The assumption that y0 is a strictly monotonic function plays a role here. It ensures that
y0!(!0(ya)) 6= 0 and hence that !0`(ya) is well-defined. We can therefore write,
R⌧`(0, 0, ya) = T 00(ya) f(!0(ya))
y0⌧ (!0(ya))
y0!(!0(ya))
+ 1  F (!0(ya)) , (A.5)
Given a simple reform (⌧, `, ya), the first order condition characterizing y⇤(⌧, `, ya,!) is
given by
1  T 00(y⇤(·))  ⌧h0(y⇤(·))  ! (1+
1
")y⇤(·)1+ 1" = 0 .
For any given `, we focus on ! so that y⇤(·,!) 2 [ya + ✏ `, ya + (1  ✏)`] and h0(y⇤(·) = 1.
Hence,
1  T 00(y⇤(·))  ⌧   ! (1+
1
")y⇤(·)1+ 1" = 0 . (A.6)
Starting from this equation, one can use the implicit function theorem to solve for y⇤⌧ (·)
and y⇤!(·). This allows to compute the ratio y
⇤
⌧ (·)
y⇤!(·) . At ⌧ = 0, and for ! = !0(ya), this ratio
equals
y0⌧ (!0(ya))
y0!(!0(ya))
=   1
1 + 1"
!0(ya)
1
1  T 00(ya)
. (A.7)
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We can now use (A.7) to substitute for y0⌧ (!0(ya))y0!(!0(ya)) in (A.5). This yields
R⌧`(0, 0, ya) =   T
0
0(ya)
1 T 00(ya) f(!0(ya)) !0(ya)
1
1+ 1"
+ 1  F (!0(ya)) . (A.8)
Proof of (1.). It follows from (A.4) that R⌧ (0, 0, ya) = 0: a small change of marginal
tax rates has no e↵ect on overall tax revenue if the change applies to a bracket with length
0. If R⌧`(0, 0, ya) > 0, then a slight increase of the bracket length implies that R⌧ (0, `, ya)
turns positive – indicating a possible to increase revenue by means of higher marginal
tax rates. Analogously, R⌧`(0, 0, ya) < 0 implies that revenue can be increased by means
of lower marginal tax rates. Thus, if R⌧`(0, 0, ya) < 0 there is a possibility of a Pareto-
improving tax cut. From (A.8) it is now straightforward to verify that R⌧`(0, 0, ya) < 0
holds if and only if (8) holds.
Proof of (2.). A Pareto-improving tax raise requires that R⌧ (0, `, ya)  `   0. Again,
it follows from (A.4) that R⌧ (0, `, ya)   l = 0 for l = 0. If however, R⌧`(0, 0, ya)   1 > 0
then a slight increase of the bracket length implies that R⌧ (0, `, ya)   ` turns positive.
From (A.8) it is now straightforward to verify that R⌧`(0, 0, ya)  1 > 0 holds if and only
if (9) holds.
A.5 A characterization of welfare-improving tax reforms
The welfare implications of a generic reform (⌧, h) are given by
W (⌧, h) :=
Z !
!
g(!) V (⌧, h,!)f(!) d! .
We assume without loss of generality that E[g(!)] = 1. Using the envelope theorem, the
marginal e↵ect of a small reform is given by
W⌧ (0, h) = R⌧ (0, h) 
Z !
!
g(!) h(y0(!)) f(!) d! .
For the special case of a simple reform (⌧, `, ya) this becomes
W⌧ (0, `, ya) = R⌧ (0, `, ya)
 
!0(ya+`)R
!0(ya)
g(!) (y0(!)  ya) f(!) d!
 ` (1  F (!0(ya + `))) G(!0(ya + `))
.
Taking the derivative with respect to ` and evaluating at ` = 0 yields
W⌧`(0, 0, ya) = R⌧`(0, 0, ya)  (1  F (!0(ya))) G(!0(ya))
Using equation (A.8) this can also be written as
W⌧`(0, 0, ya) =   T
0
0(ya)
1 T 00(ya) f(!0(ya)) !0(ya)
 
1 + 1"
  1
+(1  F (!0(ya))) (1  G(!0(ya)))
.
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Since W⌧ (0, 0, ya) = 0, W⌧`(0, 0, ya) > 0 indicates that W⌧ (0, `, ya) > 0 for ` close to zero.
Hence, when
T 00(ya)
1  T 00(ya)
<
1  F (!0(ya))
f(!0(ya)) !0(ya)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!0(ya))) (A.9)
a small tax increase for incomes close to ya yields a welfare gain. Analogously, when
T 00(ya)
1  T 00(ya)
>
1  F (!0(ya))
f(!0(ya)) !0(ya)
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!0(ya))) (A.10)
a small tax cut for incomes close to ya yields a welfare gain.
B Welfare-maximizing tax schedules
B.1 Preliminaries
We use a mechanism design approach to characterize welfare-maximizing income taxes.
With an appeal to the revelation principle we limit attention to direct mechanisms. Let
c : ! 7! c(!) and y : ! 7! y(!) be the functions that specify the pre- and after-tax
incomes of individuals as functions of their types. Let
u(!) = c(!)  k(y(!),!) with k(y(!),!) = 1
1 + 1"
✓
y(!)
!
◆1+ 1"
,
be the utility realized by a type !-individual under the direct mechanism.
As is well-known, such a direct mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if the
following two conditions are satisfied: First,
u(!) = u 
Z !
!
k2(y(s), s)ds , (B.1)
where u = u(!) is a shorthand for the utility realized by the lowest type, and k2 is the
derivative of the cost function k with respect to its second argument. With an isoelastic
cost function
k2(y(!),!) =   1
!
✓
y(!)
!
◆1+ 1"
.
Second, the function y is non-decreasing.
The resource constraint requires that aggregate consumption must not exceed aggre-
gate production
E[c(!)]  E[y(!)] ,
where the expectations operator E indicates the computation of a population average;
e.g. E[c(!)] =
R !
! c(!) f(!) d!. Using that
c(!) = u(!) + k(y(!),!)
= u  R !! k2(y(s), s)ds+ k(y(!),!)
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and with an integration by parts we can write aggregate consumption also as
E[c(!)] = u+ E[k(y(!),!)]  E

1  F (!)
f(!)
k2(y(!),!)
 
.
Upon substituting this expression into the resource constraint, we find that resource
feasibility holds provided that
u  E

y(!)  k(y(!),!) + 1  F (!)
f(!)
k2(y(!),!)
 
. (B.2)
The term on the right hand side of (B.2) is also known as the virtual surplus. It is
the regular surplus of aggregate output over e↵ort costs, E[y(!)  k(y(!),!)] minus the
information rents that higher types realize in the presence of incentive constraints and
which are given by  E
h
1 F (!)
f(!) k2(y(!),!)
i
> 0. Thus, resource feasibility requires that
the lowest type’s utility does not exceed the virtual surplus.
We consider a class of additive social welfare functions
S = E[g(!) u(!)]
and assume without loss of generality that E[g(!)] = 1. Using (B.1), and after another
integration by parts, welfare can be written as
S = u  E

1  F (!)
f(!)
G(!) k2(y(!),!)
 
, (B.3)
where G(!) := E[g(s) | s   !] is the average welfare weight among those with a type
above !. At an optimal allocation, the resource constraint (B.2) holds as an equality.
Thus, welfare can also be written as
S = E

y(!)  k(y(!),!) + 1  F (!)
f(!)
(1  G(!)) k2(y(!),!)
 
. (B.4)
B.2 Optimal mechanism design and optimal taxation
We can state the mechanism design problem now as one that only involves the function
y : ! 7! y(!). This function has to be chosen so as to maximize the objective (B.4)
subject to the constraint that its derivative y0 is everywhere non-negative. This problem
is also known as the full problem. When the monotonicity constraint is dropped, the
problem is referred to as the relaxed problem. Obviously, if the solution to the relaxed
problem satisfies the monotonicity constraint then it is also a solution to the full problem.
If not, the the solution of the full problem involves bunching, i.e. subsets of types who
choose the same level of income. For ease of exposition, we focus on the relaxed problem
in what follows. It is well known how the resulting optimal tax formulas need to be
modified if bunching is an issue, see e.g. Hellwig (2007).
Note that, once y is determined by the optimality conditions, we can use (B.2) and
the fact that the resource constraint binds to solve for u. We can use (B.1) to solve for the
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function u. And finally, we can use the fact that c(!) = u(!)+k(y(!),!) to characterize
the function c. Thus, we obtain a complete characterization of an optimal allocation.
A solution to the relaxed problem is obtained by a pointwise maximization of (B.4).
The first order condition characterizing y(!) is given by
1  k1(y(!),!) + 1  F (!)
f(!)
(1  G(!)) k21(y(!),!) = 0, (B.5)
where k1 is the derivative of the cost function k with respect to its first argument and
k21 is the cross-derivative with respect to the first and the second argument. With an
isoelastic cost function
k21(y(!),!) =  
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
1
!
k1(y(!),!)
so that the first order condition can also be written as
1  k1(y(!),!)
k1(y(!),!)
=
1  F (!)
f(!) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!)) . (B.6)
Suppose that the welfare-maximizing allocation is decentralized by means of a non-linear
income tax schedule T . Then, type ! solves the following problem:
maxy y   T (y)  k(y,!) .
Denote the solution to this problem by y⇤(!). It is characterized by the first order
condition
1  T 0(y⇤(!)) = k1(y⇤(!),!)
As y⇤(!) is also the solution to the mechanism design problem, the first order condition
in (B.6) can now be written as
T 0(y⇤(!))
1  T 0(y⇤(!)) =
1  F (!)
f(!) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
(1  G(!)) . (B.7)
Equation (B.7) is also known as Diamond’s formula, see Diamond (1998). It shows that
marginal taxes on the income earned by type ! are increasing in the inverse hazard rate,
decreasing in the elasticity " and decreasing in the welfare weight of individuals richer
than type !.
The Rawlsian schedule. The Rawlsian schedule is the special case with G(!) = 0,
for all ! > !. In this case the, the first order condition in (B.7) becomes
T 0(y⇤(!))
1  T 0(y⇤(!)) =
1  F (!)
f(!) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
. (B.8)
The Rawlsian tax schedule is also often referred to as the maxi-min schedule. It is the
schedule that maximizes u, the well-being of the worst o↵ individual, i.e. of type !.
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B.3 The maxi-max schedule
The maxim-max schedule is the one that maximizes the well-being of the best o↵ indi-
vidual, i.e. of type !. Since the welfare weights are now concentrated at the top, this
can now longer be viewed as a special case of social welfare-maximization with weights
that are higher for poorer people. This case is still of interest as it helps to interpret the
lower Pareto bound for marginal tax rates in the main text, and therefore the scope for
politically feasible reforms. We present a derivation of the maxi-max schedule along lines
that are similar to our characterization of welfare-maximizing tax schedules above. An
alternative derivation can be found in Brett and Weymark (2017).
The envelope theorem implies, that under an incentive compatible allocation,
u0(!) =  k2(y(!),!) .
Therefore
u(!) = u+
Z !
!
k2(y(s), s) ds ,
where u := u(!) is a shorthand for the utility realized by the highest type.
Using c(!) = u(!) + k(y(!),!) and after an integartion by parts we can write aggre-
gate consumption as
E[c(!)] = u+ E[k(y(!,!))] + E

F (!)
f(!)
k2(y(!),!)
 
.
Substituting this expression into the resource constraint and rearranging yields
u = E

y(!)  k(y(!,!))  F (!)
f(!)
k2(y(!),!)
 
(B.9)
The (relaxed) maxi-max problem is to choose the function y so as to maximize this
expression. Pointwise maximization yields the following first order condition
1  k1(y(!),!)  F (!)
f(!)
k21(y(!),!) = 0 .
Using one more time that, with an isoelastic cost function,
k21(y(!),!) =  
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
1
!
k1(y(!),!)
allows to rewrite the first order condition as
1  k1(y(!),!)
k1(y(!),!)
=   F (!)
f(!) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
. (B.10)
Again, if this solution is decentralized by means of an income tax schedule, then
T 0(y⇤(!))
1  T 0(y⇤(!)) =  
F (!)
f(!) !
✓
1 +
1
"
◆
. (B.11)
where y⇤(!) is now the income earned by type ! under the maxi-max schedule.
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C From theory to data
In our empirical analysis in Section 6, we check to what extent actual tax reforms are
monotonic. We also provide an answer to the question whether the median voter actually
was a beneficiary of these reforms. Here, we describe in more detail how we operationalize
these questions.
Suppose that there is a set of individuals and that, for each individual i, we observe
taxable income yi0 prior to the reform. We also observe the average tax rate t
i
0 and the
marginal tax rate ⌧ i0 that are relevant for this individual prior to the reform. Finally, we
observe the post-reform counterparts ti1 and ⌧
i
1.
Monotonicity. Checking to what extent reforms are monotonic then amounts to check-
ing whether, for any pair of individuals i and j, yi0 < y
j
0 implies (t
i
1  ti0)yi0 < (tj1  tj0)yj0. If
this relation holds, then the reform is monotonic in the sense that the tax burden of richer
individuals increases more than the tax burden of poorer individuals. Alternatively, if
yi0 < y
j
0 implies (t
i
1   ti0)yi0 > (tj1   tj0)yj0, then the reform is monotonic as the additional
taxes of poorer individuals exceed those of richer individuals. In Section X we report on
the extent to which we find such relations in our data.
Did the median voter gain? Checking whether the median voter gained requires an
assessment of whether or not the inequality
R(⌧, h) 
Z ⌧
0
h(y⇤(s, h,!M)) ds   0
holds true. Remember that R(⌧, h) is the revenue (per capita) generated by the reform
and
R ⌧
0 h(y
⇤(s, h,!M)) ds is the reform’s e↵ect on the median voter’s indirect utility. As
shown in Section 4, a su cient condition which ensures that this inequality holds is that
R(⌧, h) max (tM1   tM0 ) yM1 , (tM1   tM0 ) yM0    0 , (C.1)
where tM1 and t
M
0 are, respectively, the average tax rates for the median voter after the
reform and in the status quo.
Revenue e↵ect. For the revenue e↵ect, we compute the revenue change for each in-
dividual separately and then take an average. The revenue change due to individual i
is
Ri = ti1 y
i
1   ti0 yi0 , (C.2)
where yi1 is the individual’s income after the reform. In the presence of behavioral re-
sponses yi1 will usually be di↵erent from y
i
0. We do not observe y
i
1 and hence have to
come up with an estimate for this quantity.
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Our assumptions on preferences imply that behavioral responses are driven entirely by
changes of the marginal tax rates that individuals face. Thus, using a first order Taylor
approximation,
yi1 = y
i
0 + (⌧
i
1   ⌧ i0) yi⌧ ,
where yi⌧ is the marginal e↵ect that an infinitesimal change of the marginal tax rate has
on i’s taxable income (in the status quo). Using that yi⌧ =  yi1 ⌧ , we can express this
also via the marginal e↵ect associated with a change of the net of tax rate 1  ⌧ . Hence,
yi1 = y
i
0   (⌧ i1   ⌧ i0) yi1 ⌧ ,
Using the definition of the ETI, "i := yi1 ⌧
1 ⌧ i0
yi0
, we can rewrite this as well as
yi1 =
✓
1  ⌧
i
1   ⌧ i0
1  ⌧ i0
"i
◆
yi0 .
Upon substituting this expression into (C.2) we obtain
Ri =
✓
ti1   ti0   ti1
⌧ i1   ⌧ i0
1  ⌧ i0
"i
◆
yi0 , (C.3)
The revenue e↵ect per capita is then given by
R(⌧, h) =
1
n
X
i
Ri , (C.4)
where n is the number of individuals.
Did the median voter gain? To answer this question, we check whether or not
R(⌧, h) max
⇢
(tM1   tM0 )
✓
1  ⌧
M
1   ⌧M0
1  ⌧M0
"M
◆
yM0 , (t
M
1   tM0 ) yM0
 
  0 .(C.5)
This inequality follows from (C.1) upon replacing yM1 by✓
1  ⌧
M
1   ⌧M0
1  ⌧M0
"M
◆
yM0 ,
where ⌧M1 and ⌧
M
0 are, respectively, the marginal tax rates for the median voter after the
reform and in the status quo, and "M is the median voter’s elasticity of taxable income.
D Tax reforms in OECD countries
We provide more details on the descriptive statistics in the main text that document the
frequency of monotonic reforms in OECD countries, see Table 2.
The OECD provides annual data on key parameters of the statutory personal income
tax systems of its member countries (central governments).1 In particular, it documents
1The database provided by the OECD is Table I.1. Central government personal income tax rates
and thresholds accessible on http : //stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode = TABLEI1.
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personal income tax rates for wage income and the taxable income thresholds at which
these statutory rates apply. The information is applicable for a single person without
dependents. We use this information to construct the corresponding tax function. A
reform takes place if this tax function changes from one year to the next. The OECD
also reports personal allowances and tax credits, and we include these parameters in our
tax functions. In many countries these allowances are equivalent to having a first bracket
with a marginal tax rate of zero, see, for instance, Belgium, Estonia, Japan, Spain, the
United Kingdom, or the United States. In other countries tax credits are equivalent to
a first bracket with a marginal tax rate of zero, see, for instance, the Czech Republic,
Italy, or the Netherlands.2 In the supplementary material for this paper we present
separate statistics for di↵erent OECD countries. More specifically, the following countries
are covered: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
We excluded Slovenia because of an inconsistency in the OECD database for this country
and Germany because of an incorrect representation of the German tax system in the
OECD database.3
E Empirical analysis: Additional results
2Additional details on the methodology applied by the OECD is accessible on http :
//www.oecd.org/ctp/tax  policy/personal   income  tax  rates  explanatory   annex.pdf .
3By and large, this does not a↵ect the overall frequency of monotonic reforms. If
we include Germany and base the analysis on data from the German Federal Ministry
of Finance, accessible on https : //www.bmf   steuerrechner.de/index.xhtml; jsessionid =
46D8EC6083BF2573A42C23A2B03B49DF , then 80% of the reforms in OECD countries are found
to be monotonic. When Germany is excluded the number is 78%.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure E.1: Winners and losers of major US tax reforms: Heterogeneity within deciles
Notes: Figure E.1 shows the cross-sectional distribution by decile of the counterfactual change
in tax liability T1(yˆi0)  T0(yi0) R(⌧, h) for reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see
Table H.1 for details) for four di↵erent values of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI): 0 (blue),
0.25 (red), 1 (green) and 1.5 (yellow), by means of box-plots. Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally
to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0
are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show
di↵erent locations for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the
tax return data while the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income.
The solid line in the middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one
accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure E.2: Shares of winners and losers by decile
Notes: Figure E.2 shows the shares of reform winners (green) versus reform losers (losers) for
major reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details), by income decile
and for four di↵erent values of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI): 0, 0.25, 1 and 1.5 (from
left to right). The first four bars (“Total”) show the shares for the full population. The first bar
shows the shares for the full population. Deciles are computed based on pre-tax income without
capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the individual level.
For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to
simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using
the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure E.3: Shares of winners by decile
Notes: Figure E.3 shows the shares of reform winners for major reforms of the US federal
personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details), by income decile and for four di↵erent values
of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI): 0 (blue), 0.25 (red), 1 (green) and 1.5 (yellow). The
first four dots (“Total”) show the shares for the full population. Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to
each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are
inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure E.4: E↵ective marginal tax rates by decile before and after each reform
Notes: Figure E.4 shows, separately for each decile e↵ective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) T 0
before (blue) and after (red) major reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see Table
H.1 for details). Deciles are computed based on pre-tax income without capital gains while tax
base includes capital gains. All computations are on the individual level. For this, the income
of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual
tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as
uprating factor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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F Empirical analysis: Sensitivity checks
In this section, we conduct sensitivity checks of our empirical results with respect to
several choices made. More precisely, we reproduce Figure 2 with the following variations:
(i) Tax units (instead of equal split couples) – see Figure F.1;
(ii) Statutory tax rates (instead of e↵ective tax rates) – see Figure F.2;
(iii) Di↵erent bin sizes (50 instead of 10) – see Figure F.3;
(iv) Di↵erent income definitions: gross income including capital gains (see Figure F.4)
and adjusted gross income (see Figure F.5), respectively;
(v) Including state-level and payroll taxes – see Figure F.6.
To preview the findings below: Figures F.1 – F.6 reveal the same message as Figure
2, namely that reforms are by and large monotonic. The main di↵erences are reported
below. Given that the value of T1 (yˆi0)   T0 (yi0) depicted in these Figures is the key
ingredient for all other computations, it is not surprising that these sensitivity checks
also do not a↵ect the other figures reported in the paper. For brevity reasons, we refrain
from showing these variations here but they are available upon request.
An interesting observation for TRA69 and RA78 is that the e↵ects reported in Figure
F.2 based on statutory tax rates di↵er from using e↵ective tax rates instead as in Figure
2: this shows the importance of accounting for tax base changes. The same is true for
other reforms albeit to a smaller extend. This shows the importance of using a micro
data based microsimulation approach for the evaluation of tax reforms.
As reported in Figure F.6, the monotonicity pattern is di↵erent when we include
state-level and payroll taxes for the three oldest reforms only (RA64, TRA69, RA78).
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.1: Changes in tax liability: Average values per tax unit decile
Notes: Figure F.1 replicates Figure 2 with tax units instead of individual taxpayers. It shows
the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
    T0  yi0  for reforms of
the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income decile. The red line
represents a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the tax unit level. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income
from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical
lines show di↵erent locations for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers
to the tax return data while the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by
income. The solid line in the middle represents both the original median in the data as well as
the one accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.2: Changes in statutory tax liability: Average values per decile
Notes: Figure F.2 replicates Figure 2 using statutory tax rates instead of e↵ective tax rates. It
shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  T0  yi0  for reforms
of the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income decile. The red line
represents a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally
to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0
are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show
di↵erent locations for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the
tax return data while the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income.
The solid line in the middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one
accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
19
(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.3: Changes in tax liability: Average values per 50 income bins
Notes: Figure F.3 replicates Figure 2 using 50 income bins instead of deciles. It shows the
average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  T0  yi0  for reforms of the US
federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income bin. The red line represents
a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. Deciles are computed based on pre-tax
income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations are on the
individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse.
In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year
1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show di↵erent locations
for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the tax return data while
the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income. The solid line in the
middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one accounting for both
modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.4: Changes in tax liability including capital gains: Average values per decile
Notes: Figure F.4 replicates Figure 2 using deciles including capital gains. It shows the average
value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  T0  yi0  for reforms of the US federal
personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income bin. The red line represents a
quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. All computations are on the individual level.
For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to
simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using
the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show di↵erent locations for the
median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the tax return data while the
dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income. The solid line in the
middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one accounting for both
modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.5: Changes in tax liability: Average values per adjusted gross income decile
Notes: Figure F.5 replicates Figure 2 using deciles based on adjusted gross income (AGI). It
shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  T0  yi0  for reforms
of the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income bin. The red line
represents a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. All computations are on the
individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally to each spouse.
In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0 are inflated to year
1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show di↵erent locations
for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the tax return data while
the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income. The solid line in the
middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one accounting for both
modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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(a) RA64 (b) TRA69 (c) RA78
(d) ERTA81 (e) TRA86 (f) OBRA90
(g) OBRA93 (h) EGTRRA01 (i) JGTRRA03
(j) ATRA12 (k) TCJA17
Figure F.6: Changes in tax liability including state-level and payroll taxes: Average
values per decile
Notes: Figure F.6 replicates Figure 2 by including state-level and payroll taxes. It shows
the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
    T0  yi0  for reforms of
the US federal personal income tax (see Table H.1 for details) by income bin. The red line
represents a quadratic fit based on the underlying micro data. Deciles are computed based on
pre-tax income without capital gains while tax base includes capital gains. All computations
are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing jointly is allocated equally
to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
, income from year 0
are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor. The vertical lines show
di↵erent locations for the median voter: the dashed line to the left imputes non-filers to the
tax return data while the dashed line to the right accounts for di↵erential turnout by income.
The solid line in the middle represents both the original median in the data as well as the one
accounting for both modifications simultaneously.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
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Correlation Rank Correlation
RA64 0.829 0.957
TRA69 0.270 0.765
RA78 0.318 0.716
ERTA81 0.641 0.871
TRA86 0.681 0.794
OBRA90 0.931 0.836
OBRA93 0.952 0.828
EGTRRA01 0.820 0.842
JGTRRA03 0.853 0.887
ATRA12 0.855 0.845
TCJA17 0.741 0.857
Table F.1: Monotonicity of reforms – correlation analysis
Notes: This table shows the (rank) correlation between the counterfactual change in tax liability
T1
 
yˆi0
  T0  yi0  (see Figure 2) and pre-tax income for reforms of the US federal personal income tax (see
Table H.1 for details). All computations are on the individual level. For this, the income of couples filing
jointly is allocated equally to each spouse. In order to simulate counterfactual tax payments T1
 
yˆi0
 
,
income from year 0 are inflated to year 1 using the CPI-U-RS deflator as uprating factor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBER TAXSIM and IRS-SOI PUF.
G Tax Reform Proposals
In order to answer the question whether the finding that tax reforms are, by and large,
monotonic, extends to tax reforms proposals which are publicly debated, but not en-
acted, we invoke the systematic analysis of reform proposals in the US that is pro-
vided by the Tax Policy Center. The data is taken from the Tax Policy Center’s ex
ante analysis of each reform proposal. Details on the underlying data, methods and
simulation model can be found here: https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/resources/
brief-description-tax-model. For each proposal, there is a code (“Source”) corre-
sponding to the source document from the Tax Policy Center’s webpage.4
We identified 69 reform proposals that were made in the period 2003-2019: some
proposals were made during presidential campaigns and primaries, others were proposed
by the Administration during the legislative process. Figures G.1 – G.8 and Tables G.1
– G.8 below synthesize the Tax Policy Center’s ex-ante analyses of the absolute (dollar)
tax payment changes by income quantiles of reform proposals of the federal personal
income tax between 2003 and 2019. All tables provide a code corresponding to the
source document from the Tax Policy Center, the year of the projection, the type of
taxes underlying the analysis and the employed baseline. The selection criteria for the
4See, e.g, for TCJA17 https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/
individual-income-tax-provisions-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-tcja-february-2018/t18-0024.
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proposals/reforms were that (1) they concern personal income taxes, (2) they significantly
impact all income percentiles and (3) they were formal proposals from the Administration,
Candidates, Political Parties, or particular Congress members. In case there are several
projections available for one proposal and di↵erent years, only the one that is closest to
the date of the proposal is included. Estimations using di↵erent baselines are included if
changing the baseline significantly a↵ects the estimates (due to many temporary taxes).
(a) Trump Revised (b) Trump (c) Clinton Revised
(d) Clinton (e) Cruz (f) Rubio
(g) Bush (h) Sanders
Figure G.1: Change in tax liability by quintile, 2016 US Presidential campaign
Notes: Figure G.1 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.1 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Romney A (b) Romney B (c) Romney C
(d) Romney D (e) Santorum A (f) Santorum B
(g) Perry A (h) Perry B (i) Gingrich A
(j) Gingrich B (k) Cain
Figure G.2: Change in tax liability by quintile, 2012 US Presidential campaign
Notes: Figure G.2 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.2 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Obama A (b) Obama B (c) Obama C
(d) McCain A (e) McCain B (f) McCain C
(g) Kerry A (h) Kerry B
Figure G.3: Change in tax liability by quintile, 2008 and 2004 US Presidential campaigns
Notes: Figure G.3 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.3 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Working Families Tax
Relief Act
(b) House GOP Tax Plan
(c) Gov. Pawlenty Proposal
A
(d) Gov. Pawlenty Proposal
B
(e) Bowles-Simpson Plan A (f) Bowles-Simpson Plan B
(g) Bowles-Simpson Plan C (h) Bowles-Simpson Plan D (i) Bowles-Simpson Plan E
(j) Bowles-Simpson Plan F
Figure G.4: Change in tax liability by quintile for reform proposals
Notes: Figure G.4 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.4 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Wyden-Gregg Act A (b) Wyden-Gregg Act B
(c) Roadmap for America’s
Future Act A
(d) Roadmap for America’s
Future Act B
(e) Roadmap for America’s
Future Act C
(f) Roadmap for America’s
Future Act D
(g) House Republican Stim-
ulus Proposal A
(h) House Republican Stim-
ulus Proposal B
(i) Sen. Thompson’s Tax
Plan
(j) Democratic Stimulus
Proposal
Figure G.5: Change in tax liability by quintile for reform proposals
Notes: Figure G.5 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.5 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Unified Framework
(b) Proposal for Budget
FY2010 A
(c) Proposal for Budget
FY2010 B
(d) Proposal for Budget
FY2011 A
(e) Proposal for Budget
FY2011 B
(f) Proposal for Budget
FY2012 A
(g) Proposal for Budget
FY2012 B
Figure G.6: Change in tax liability by quintile for reform proposals
Notes: Figure G.6 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.6 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Proposal for Budget
FY2013 A
(b) Proposal for Budget
FY2013 B
(c) Proposal for Budget
FY2014
(d) Proposal for Budget
FY2015
(e) Implement a Simplified
Tax System
(f) Integrated Payroll Tax
Plan
Figure G.7: Change in tax liability by quintile for reform proposals
Notes: Figure G.7 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.7 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
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(a) Middle Class Tax Relief
and Job Creation Act
(b) Temporary Payroll Tax
Cut Continuation Act
(c) Tax Relief, UI Reautho-
rization, and Job Creation
Act A
(d) Tax Relief, UI Reautho-
rization, and Job Creation
Act B
(e) American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act
(f) Economic Stimulus Act
(g) Tax Increase Prevention
Act
(h) Tax Increase Prevention
and Reconciliation Act
(i) Working Families Tax Re-
lief Act B
Figure G.8: Change in tax liability by quintile for reform proposals
Notes: Figure G.8 shows the average value of the counterfactual change in tax liability T1
 
yˆi0
  
T0
 
yi0
 
for reform proposals of the US federal personal income tax by income quintile. The first
column shows the overall counterfactual tax change. The dashed horizontal line shows the
revenue neutral benchmark (via lump sum redistribution) for an ETI of zero. The data is taken
from the Tax Policy Center’s ex ante analysis of each reform proposal (see Table G.8 for details).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Tax Policy Center.
32
T
ab
le
G
.1
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
20
16
P
re
si
d
en
ti
al
C
am
p
ai
gn
T
ax
P
ro
p
os
al
s
T
ru
m
p
R
e-
v
is
ed
T
ru
m
p
C
li
n
to
n
R
ev
is
ed
C
li
n
to
n
C
ru
z
R
u
b
io
B
u
sh
S
a
n
d
er
s
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
17
20
17
20
17
20
17
20
17
20
17
20
17
20
17
P
a
rt
y
A
 
li
a
ti
o
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
S
o
u
rc
e
T
16
-0
21
2
T
15
-0
23
4
T
16
-0
22
5
T
16
-0
04
1
T
16
-0
02
1
T
16
-0
00
3
T
15
-0
17
1
T
16
-0
05
4
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
10
-1
28
-1
00
4
-4
6
-2
51
-1
85
16
5
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-4
00
-9
69
-1
40
15
-5
88
-4
50
-5
93
16
25
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
01
0
-2
73
2
-1
10
44
-1
78
3
-1
36
5
-1
46
4
46
92
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
03
0
-5
36
9
-4
0
14
3
-4
50
4
-3
04
3
-2
59
3
90
51
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
66
60
-2
51
80
66
90
45
27
-3
54
71
-1
60
08
-1
39
47
44
75
9
A
ll
-2
94
0
-5
14
4
83
0
65
7
-6
09
5
-3
14
6
-2
81
3
89
64
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-3
27
0
-7
73
1
10
0
24
6
-8
90
7
-6
05
9
-4
25
8
14
80
9
9
0
-9
4
-5
35
0
-1
14
76
75
0
64
2
-1
61
29
-8
96
5
-5
11
5
19
82
8
9
5
-9
8
-1
84
90
-2
76
57
46
90
26
73
-3
93
52
-1
53
64
-1
32
56
37
80
1
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
-2
14
69
0
-2
75
25
7
11
77
60
78
28
4
-4
07
70
8
-1
62
64
6
-1
67
32
5
52
53
65
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
33
T
ab
le
G
.2
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
20
12
P
re
si
d
en
ti
al
C
am
p
ai
gn
T
ax
P
ro
p
os
al
s
R
o
m
n
ey
A
R
o
m
n
ey
B
R
o
m
n
ey
C
R
o
m
n
ey
D
S
a
n
to
ru
m
A
S
a
n
to
ru
m
B
P
er
ry
A
P
er
ry
B
G
in
g
ri
ch
G
in
g
ri
ch
C
a
in
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
13
P
a
rt
y
A
 
li
a
ti
o
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
S
o
u
rc
e
T
12
-0
03
9
T
12
-0
04
1
T
12
-0
00
2
T
12
-0
00
4
T
12
-0
01
2
T
12
-0
01
4
T
11
-0
37
7
T
11
-0
37
9
T
11
-0
40
3
T
11
-0
40
5
T
11
-0
37
3
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-7
7
14
9
-6
9
15
7
-2
65
-3
9
-6
6
16
0
-1
85
6
16
59
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-8
59
-9
7
-6
81
82
-1
14
4
-3
83
-3
11
45
2
-5
93
-2
95
31
89
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
05
4
-8
10
-1
38
3
-1
38
-2
74
4
-1
50
2
-1
25
8
-1
3
-1
46
4
-1
11
8
32
38
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-4
91
9
-2
13
9
-3
31
5
-5
32
-6
87
9
-4
10
2
-3
60
7
-8
22
-2
59
3
-2
91
6
20
71
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
68
45
-1
61
34
-1
76
53
-6
89
9
-3
97
50
-2
90
70
-3
40
04
-2
32
26
-1
39
47
-2
85
72
-2
35
22
A
ll
-5
34
2
-2
84
7
-3
56
6
-1
06
4
-7
79
9
-5
30
9
-5
88
9
-3
38
3
-2
81
3
-4
93
6
-1
27
1
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-9
07
6
-4
17
7
-6
04
8
-1
14
3
-1
37
18
-8
82
4
-7
62
7
-2
71
9
-4
25
8
-5
72
3
-1
87
1
9
0
-9
4
-1
46
39
-7
75
9
-9
49
1
-2
59
9
-2
26
63
-1
57
93
-1
39
51
-7
05
1
-5
11
5
-1
05
51
-7
10
4
9
5
-9
8
-3
42
43
-2
23
68
-1
93
93
-7
47
7
-4
93
14
-3
74
71
-4
01
83
-2
82
43
-1
32
56
-2
87
89
-2
67
37
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
-2
31
97
1
-1
49
99
7
-1
64
71
9
-8
21
88
-3
41
44
7
-2
59
86
5
-3
66
73
9
-2
83
90
3
-1
67
32
5
-3
40
17
9
-3
07
47
3
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
34
T
ab
le
G
.3
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
20
04
an
d
20
08
P
re
si
d
en
ti
al
C
am
p
ai
gn
T
ax
P
ro
p
os
al
s
O
b
a
m
a
A
O
b
a
m
a
B
O
b
a
m
a
C
M
cC
a
in
A
M
cC
a
in
B
M
cC
a
in
C
K
er
ry
A
K
er
ry
B
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
05
20
05
P
a
rt
y
A
 
li
a
ti
o
n
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
S
o
u
rc
e
T
08
-0
17
2
T
08
-0
17
0
T
08
-0
11
4
T
08
-0
18
4
T
08
-0
18
2
T
08
-0
10
8
T
04
-0
01
8
T
04
-0
02
0
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
[ 1]
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-5
67
-5
67
-5
67
-6
5
-2
1
-1
9
-8
1
-8
0
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-8
92
-8
92
-8
92
-2
59
-1
18
-1
13
-1
15
-6
6
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
11
8
-1
04
1
-1
04
2
-6
08
-3
25
-3
19
-2
10
-5
7
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
26
4
-1
25
7
-1
29
0
-1
48
7
-9
94
-1
00
9
-3
61
-4
9
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
56
97
41
15
40
92
-1
21
44
-6
49
8
-6
26
4
41
12
13
A
ll
67
-1
51
-1
60
-2
25
0
-1
23
0
-1
19
5
-1
46
19
4
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-2
13
2
-2
13
0
-2
20
4
-3
73
6
-2
58
4
-2
61
4
9
0
-9
4
-2
76
4
-2
76
3
-2
78
9
-6
32
2
-4
43
7
-4
38
0
9
5
-9
8
79
9
-2
0
12
-1
58
77
-8
15
9
-7
87
1
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
14
36
88
11
57
13
11
59
74
-1
09
21
4
-4
88
62
-4
53
61
23
30
9
24
31
9
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
35
T
ab
le
G
.4
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
T
ax
R
ef
or
m
P
ro
p
os
al
s
(n
ot
in
it
ia
te
d
by
th
e
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
)
P
ar
t
1
W
o
rk
in
g
F
a
m
i-
li
es
T
a
x
R
el
ie
f
A
ct
H
o
u
se
G
O
P
T
a
x
P
la
n
G
o
v
.
P
aw
-
le
n
ty
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
A
G
o
v
.
P
aw
-
le
n
ty
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
B
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
A
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
B
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
C
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
D
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
E
B
o
w
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
P
la
n
F
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
19
20
17
20
13
20
13
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
p
o
sa
l
20
19
20
16
20
11
20
11
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
O
ri
g
in
a
to
r
S
en
at
e
D
em
oc
ra
ts
H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
-
se
nt
at
iv
es
G
O
P
G
ov
.
P
aw
le
nt
y
G
ov
.
P
aw
le
nt
y
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
B
ow
le
s-
S
im
p
so
n
D
efi
ci
t
C
om
m
is
-
si
on
S
o
u
rc
e
T
19
-0
05
3
T
16
-0
19
7
T
11
-0
16
9
T
11
-0
17
1
T
10
-0
24
7
T
10
-0
24
8
T
10
-0
25
1
T
10
-0
25
2
T
10
-0
25
3
T
10
-0
25
4
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-7
20
-5
0
-2
18
-2
3
31
9
40
2
15
2
23
4
-1
35
-5
3
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-6
40
-1
20
-9
19
-2
05
75
7
13
70
29
3
90
6
-1
81
43
2
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-3
50
-2
60
-2
05
7
-9
55
73
8
18
90
-1
13
10
39
-7
76
37
6
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
90
-4
10
-4
82
5
-2
57
2
12
1
28
45
-1
17
7
15
48
-2
11
2
61
2
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
90
-1
17
60
-3
31
49
-2
35
57
-1
75
5
88
48
-3
07
5
75
27
-1
97
6
86
26
A
ll
-4
60
-1
81
0
-6
26
7
-4
07
8
16
5
25
83
-5
69
18
50
-8
78
15
40
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-2
20
-3
10
-1
00
51
-5
67
2
-6
02
40
20
-2
08
4
25
38
-2
82
4
17
98
9
0
-9
4
-1
90
-3
70
-1
54
95
-9
65
4
-1
69
0
51
61
-3
01
3
38
38
-3
84
6
30
05
9
5
-9
8
-1
60
-7
69
0
-3
64
03
-2
57
96
-3
34
8
82
10
-4
39
0
71
68
-5
32
1
62
38
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
0
-2
12
66
0
-3
37
43
9
-2
61
43
3
-7
32
2
77
40
9
-8
11
8
76
61
3
28
70
4
11
34
34
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
36
T
ab
le
G
.5
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
T
ax
R
ef
or
m
P
ro
p
os
al
s
(n
ot
in
it
ia
te
d
by
th
e
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
)
P
ar
t
2
W
y
d
en
-
G
re
g
g
A
ct
)
W
y
d
en
-
G
re
g
g
A
ct
)
R
o
a
d
m
a
p
fo
r
A
m
er
-
ic
a
’s
F
u
tu
re
A
ct
A
R
o
a
d
m
a
p
fo
r
A
m
er
-
ic
a
’s
F
u
tu
re
A
ct
B
R
o
a
d
m
a
p
fo
r
A
m
er
-
ic
a
’s
F
u
tu
re
A
ct
C
R
o
a
d
m
a
p
fo
r
A
m
er
-
ic
a
’s
F
u
tu
re
A
ct
D
R
ep
u
b
li
-
ca
n
S
ti
m
u
lu
s
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
A
R
ep
u
b
li
-
ca
n
S
ti
m
u
lu
s
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
B
S
en
.
T
h
o
m
p
-
so
n
’s
T
a
x
P
la
n
D
em
o
cr
a
ti
c
S
ti
m
u
lu
s
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
14
20
14
20
14
20
14
20
14
20
14
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
03
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
p
o
sa
l
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
20
09
20
09
20
07
20
03
O
ri
g
in
a
to
r
S
en
.
W
yd
er
an
d
S
en
.
G
re
gg
S
en
.
W
yd
er
an
d
S
en
.
G
re
gg
R
ep
.
R
ya
n
R
ep
.
R
ya
n
R
ep
.
R
ya
n
R
ep
.
R
ya
n
H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
-
se
nt
at
iv
es
G
O
P
H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
-
se
nt
at
iv
es
G
O
P
S
en
.
T
h
om
p
-
so
n
H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
-
se
nt
at
iv
es
D
em
oc
ra
ts
S
o
u
rc
e
T
10
-0
12
2
T
10
-0
11
9
T
10
-0
08
7
T
10
-0
09
1
T
10
-0
08
9
T
10
-0
09
3
T
09
-0
04
6
T
09
-0
04
8
T
07
-0
33
4
T
03
-0
00
5
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
42
-6
4
39
3
47
2
-1
80
-1
64
-4
5
-4
5
-2
5
-2
34
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-9
57
-3
69
54
1
11
37
62
33
9
-4
52
-4
55
-2
84
-2
92
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
60
3
-5
81
15
2
12
27
-1
7
79
4
-1
17
3
-1
29
5
-7
74
-3
37
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
59
4
-2
50
-1
65
22
42
-4
54
16
94
-1
34
5
-2
43
2
-2
19
9
-4
13
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-7
63
8
22
27
-2
37
56
-1
38
85
-2
44
78
-1
52
50
-2
80
6
-4
62
7
-9
13
8
-5
09
A
ll
-2
14
0
71
-3
29
8
-1
06
3
-3
74
2
-1
78
6
-9
88
-1
46
5
-2
48
5
-3
57
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-4
06
8
19
6
-1
70
1
26
09
-2
07
9
19
29
-1
24
2
-3
56
8
-4
26
2
-5
01
9
0
-9
4
-4
39
1
16
22
-3
02
2
31
95
-3
61
8
19
72
-1
73
4
-3
79
3
-8
14
0
-5
16
9
5
-9
8
-7
57
9
25
94
-2
09
31
-1
02
96
-2
19
77
-1
25
53
-3
60
1
-4
27
8
-1
26
26
-5
20
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
-5
89
90
23
86
1
-3
53
89
1
-2
74
17
1
-3
57
37
6
-2
79
52
1
-2
04
12
-2
05
59
-4
89
33
-5
18
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
37
T
ab
le
G
.6
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
T
ax
R
ef
or
m
P
ro
p
os
al
s
(i
n
it
ia
te
d
by
th
e
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
)
P
ar
t
1
U
n
ifi
ed
F
ra
m
ew
o
rk
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
0
A
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
0
B
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
1
A
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
1
B
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
2
A
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
2
B
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
18
20
12
20
11
20
12
20
12
20
13
20
13
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
p
o
sa
l
20
17
20
09
20
09
20
10
20
10
20
11
20
11
S
o
u
rc
e
T
17
-0
22
5
T
09
-0
13
2
T
09
-0
50
1
T
10
-0
03
7
T
10
-0
03
9
T
11
-0
02
7
T
11
-0
02
9
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
-
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
-
ic
y
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-6
0
-5
72
-4
96
-2
84
-2
16
-2
72
-2
16
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
90
-1
19
7
-1
05
9
-8
44
-2
64
-8
05
-2
64
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-6
60
-1
62
5
-1
48
4
-1
26
1
-2
44
-1
16
6
-2
44
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
11
0
-2
74
7
-2
55
3
-2
39
6
-2
29
-2
29
7
-2
29
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-8
47
0
-5
02
8
-6
48
3
-5
46
5
36
98
-4
88
2
36
98
A
ll
-1
57
0
-1
96
5
-2
05
1
-1
72
9
34
7
-1
59
9
34
7
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-1
14
0
-4
67
2
-4
69
0
-4
43
9
-2
73
-4
18
4
-2
73
9
0
-9
4
-1
50
0
-5
79
0
-5
90
0
-5
82
0
-2
22
-5
65
4
-2
22
9
5
-9
8
-7
62
0
-6
22
3
-8
57
9
-7
99
4
18
57
-6
88
1
18
57
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
-1
29
03
0
-1
38
-1
87
55
-3
96
6
68
90
6
-2
05
68
90
6
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
38
T
ab
le
G
.7
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
T
ax
R
ef
or
m
P
ro
p
os
al
s
(i
n
it
ia
te
d
by
th
e
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
)
P
ar
t
2
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
3
A
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
3
B
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
4
A
P
ro
p
o
sa
l
fo
r
B
u
d
g
et
F
Y
2
0
1
5
B
Im
p
le
m
en
t
a
S
im
p
li
-
fi
ed
T
a
x
S
y
st
em
In
te
g
ra
te
d
P
ay
ro
ll
T
a
x
P
la
n
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
14
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
10
20
08
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
p
o
sa
l
20
12
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
10
20
07
S
o
u
rc
e
T
12
-0
04
3
T
12
-0
04
5
T
13
-0
13
4
T
14
-0
05
7
T
10
-0
07
7
T
07
-0
20
9
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
-
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
-
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
96
-2
2
-1
26
-1
3
-1
81
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-7
31
-2
2
1
-2
3
-5
3
-2
64
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
13
3
-4
0
-1
3
-1
8
-6
2
-3
37
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
25
5
-2
2
-1
5
-1
7
19
-4
20
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-3
76
2
56
83
25
37
25
19
45
02
33
45
A
ll
-1
35
5
80
7
36
8
31
2
64
4
43
1
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-4
27
9
68
29
14
13
2
71
08
9
0
-9
4
-5
65
9
12
0
65
93
12
7
13
41
0
9
5
-9
8
-5
74
3
44
95
26
52
26
77
27
07
43
12
6
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
18
51
9
93
70
7
39
73
9
38
26
4
76
55
8
65
68
9
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
39
T
ab
le
G
.8
:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
of
F
u
rt
h
er
A
m
en
d
ed
T
ax
R
ef
or
m
s
M
id
d
le
C
la
ss
T
a
x
R
el
ie
f
a
n
d
J
o
b
C
re
a
ti
o
n
A
ct
T
em
p
o
ra
ry
P
ay
ro
ll
T
a
x
C
u
t
C
o
n
ti
n
-
u
a
ti
o
n
A
ct
T
a
x
R
el
ie
f,
U
n
em
-
p
lo
y
m
en
t
In
su
ra
n
ce
R
ea
u
th
o
-
ri
za
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
J
o
b
C
re
a
ti
o
n
A
ct
A
T
a
x
R
el
ie
f,
U
n
em
-
p
lo
y
m
en
t
In
su
ra
n
ce
R
ea
u
th
o
-
ri
za
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
J
o
b
C
re
a
ti
o
n
A
ct
B
A
m
er
ic
a
n
R
ec
o
v
er
y
a
n
d
R
ei
n
-
v
es
tm
en
t
A
ct
E
co
n
o
m
ic
S
ti
m
u
lu
s
A
ct
T
a
x
In
-
cr
ea
se
P
re
v
en
-
ti
o
n
A
ct
T
a
x
In
-
cr
ea
se
P
re
v
en
-
ti
o
n
a
n
d
R
ec
o
n
-
ci
li
a
ti
o
n
A
ct
W
o
rk
in
g
F
a
m
il
ie
s
T
a
x
R
el
ie
f
A
ct
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
20
12
20
12
20
11
20
11
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
Y
ea
r
o
f
p
ro
p
o
sa
l
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
05
20
04
S
o
u
rc
e
T
12
-0
03
4
T
12
-0
00
6
T
10
-0
27
3
T
10
-0
27
5
T
09
-0
11
3
T
08
-0
06
2
T
07
-0
34
3
T
06
-0
08
6
T
04
-0
15
4
B
a
se
li
n
e
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
( 1)
()
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
( 1)
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
P
ol
ic
y
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
C
u
rr
en
t
L
aw
L
o
w
es
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
-8
9
-1
5
-3
51
-3
07
-4
73
-4
20
0
0
-2
S
ec
o
n
d
Q
u
in
ti
le
-3
09
-5
2
-1
04
7
-5
24
-6
42
-6
53
0
-7
-5
5
M
id
d
le
Q
u
in
ti
le
-5
97
-1
03
-1
71
3
-7
72
-7
65
-8
24
-4
-2
0
-1
62
F
o
u
rt
h
Q
u
in
ti
le
-1
10
5
-1
91
-3
18
6
-1
29
6
-1
26
3
-9
69
-8
8
-1
17
-3
31
T
o
p
Q
u
in
ti
le
-2
02
1
-3
41
-1
08
87
-2
55
6
-3
11
3
-7
15
-1
41
5
-2
11
9
-1
31
7
A
ll
-6
82
-1
16
-2
82
3
-9
50
-1
09
2
-7
15
-3
01
-4
53
-3
74
A
d
d
en
d
u
m
8
0
-8
9
-1
78
0
-3
02
-5
90
6
-2
06
8
-2
47
0
-9
75
-7
04
9
0
-9
4
-2
22
6
-3
76
-7
75
9
-2
54
4
-3
73
2
-6
88
-1
51
4
9
5
-9
8
-2
27
8
-3
80
-1
19
83
-2
90
3
-4
64
2
-2
68
-3
25
3
T
o
p
1
P
er
ce
n
t
-2
40
7
-3
96
-7
08
36
-6
09
5
-5
14
-3
8
-6
84
-1
40
94
-2
39
0
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
co
u
nt
er
fa
ct
u
al
ch
an
ge
in
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
y
T
1
  yˆi 0 
 
T
0
  yi 0 
fo
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
s
of
th
e
U
S
fe
d
er
al
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
ta
x
by
in
co
m
e
qu
in
ti
le
as
w
el
la
s
a
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
fo
r
th
e
to
p
qu
in
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
is
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r’
s
ex
an
te
an
al
ys
is
of
ea
ch
re
fo
rm
p
ro
p
os
al
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
d
at
a,
m
et
h
od
s
an
d
si
m
u
la
ti
on
m
od
el
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
h
er
e:
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
a
x
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
e
n
t
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
/
b
r
i
e
f
-
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-
t
a
x
-
m
o
d
e
l
.
F
or
ea
ch
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
er
e
is
a
co
d
e
(“
S
ou
rc
e”
)
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
to
th
e
so
u
rc
e
d
oc
u
m
en
t
fr
om
th
e
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
p
os
al
,
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
an
d
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
b
as
el
in
e
(c
u
rr
en
t
la
w
vs
.
cu
rr
en
t
p
ol
ic
y)
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
T
ax
P
ol
ic
y
C
en
te
r.
40
H Details on US Tax Reforms
In this section, we briefly outline the major changes in the US personal income tax system
from 1964 until 2017. Table H.1 provides an overview of the 11 reforms that we identified
and analyze. We concentrate on large legislative changes which drive the tax policy e↵ect.
Reforms of interest are the Revenue Act of 1964 (RA64), the Tax Reform Act of 1969
(TRA69), the Revenue Act of 1978 (RA78), the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA81), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93), the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA01), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03), the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA12) and the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA17).
Tax reform pre post key features of the reform
RA64 1962 1966 Tax cut (top rate from 91% to 70%)
TRA69 1968 1970 Introduction of Alternative Minimum Tax and new tax
schedule for single taxpayers
RA78 1978 1979 Widening of tax brackets (and reducing their number)
ERTA81 1980 1984 Tax cut (top rate from 70% to 50%)
TRA86 1985 1988 Broadening of tax base and reductions in MTRs (top rate
from 50% to 28%)
OBRA90 1990 1991 Increase of top tax rate from 28% to 31%
OBRA93 1992 1993 Expansion of EITC and increase of top tax rate from 31%
to 39.6%
EGTRRA01 2000 2002 Reductions in marginal tax rates
JGTRRA03 2002 2003 Reductions in marginal tax rates
ATRA12 2012 2013 Increase of tax rates for high income earners
TCJA17 2016 2018 Tax cuts (top rate from 39.6% to 37%)
Table H.1: Overview of US reforms
Notes: Table H.1 lists the major reforms of the federal income tax in the US after WWII: the Revenue
Act of 1964 (RA64), the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA69), the Revenue Act of 1978 (RA78), the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93), the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA01), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003 (JGTRRA03), the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA12) and the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 (TCJA17). The pre reform year is always the last year before any change was implemented
while the post reform year is the one after all changes are phased in (except for RA64 due to only
bi-annual data availability of SOI PUF before 1966).
The key features of these reforms as well as distributional ex ante analyses of these
reforms are summarized in the following.
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RA64: RA64 was proposed by President Kennedy, thus often referred to as “Kennedy
tax cuts”, but came into e↵ect only after his assassination in 1964. Individual tax rates
were reduced considerably, with the marginal rate at the top dropping from 91% to 70%.
The tax revenue e↵ect was negative (Tempalski (2006)). To the best of our knowledge,
there is no retrievable distributional analysis for this reform and we provide such an
analysis in Figure 2 .
TRA69: The main goal of TRA69 was to tax high-income earners who had previously
avoided paying taxes due to various exemptions and deductions by creating the Alterna-
tive Minimum Tax (AMT). There were also some tax rate and bracket changes (mostly
for single taxpayers) and some changes to standard deductions and personal exemptions.
The tax revenue e↵ect was negative (Tempalski (2006)). To the best of our knowledge,
there is no retrievable distributional analysis for this reform and we provide such an
analysis in Figure 2 .
RA78: RA78 reduced individual income taxes by widening tax brackets, reducing the
number of tax rates, increasing the personal exemption, increasing the standard deduction
and reducing the e↵ective tax rate on realized capital gains. The tax revenue e↵ect
was negative (Tempalski (2006)). To the best of our knowledge, there is no retrievable
distributional analysis for this reform and we provide such an analysis in Figure 2 .
ERTA81: ERTA81 introduced the indexation of individual income tax parameters
which became e↵ective in 1985. Tax cuts were phased in over the years 1982–1984, with
a reduction of top marginal tax rates from 70% to 50% in 1982 and of other tax rates by
23% in three annual steps. Further, the income threshold for the top rate substantially
increased from $85,600 in 1982 to $109,400 (1983) and $162,400 (1984) for married cou-
ples filing jointly. Similarly, thresholds were increased for couples filing separately and
for singles. The Joint Committee on Taxation (1981) conducted an ex ante analysis of
the anticipated distributional e↵ects. Estimates for the year 1982 show that all income
classes are expected to pay less taxes (see Table H.3).
TRA86: Key aspects of TRA86 were the broadening of the tax base and reductions in
marginal tax rates.5 TRA86 further lowered the top marginal rate to 38.5% in 1987 and
to 28% in 1988, reduced the number of tax brackets from 15 in 1986 to two in 1988, but
also substantially expanded the EITC with financial benefits for low–income households.
The Joint Committee on Taxation (1986) conducted an ex ante analysis of the anticipated
distributional e↵ects. The prediction was that all taxpayers would gain (see Table H.3).
5As part of the tax burden was e↵ectively shifted from the individual to the corporate sector which
is not part of our analysis, TRA86 constitutes a tax cut in the context of this paper.
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OBRA90 & OBRA93: OBRA90 contained increases in income taxes as well as ex-
pansions of the EITC and other low–income credits. Furthermore, payroll taxes were
increased by lifting the taxable maximum for Medicare which was finally abolished in
1994. OBRA93 then led to the largest single expansion of the EITC (cf. Eissa and
Hoynes (2011), and further increases in income tax rates were implemented, e.g. the top
rate rose from 31% to 39.6% in 1993. The EITC became much more generous in 1994
with higher maximum credits and an expansion to single workers with no children. The
EITC was further expanded in the following years. Joint Committee on Taxation (1990)
and Congressional Budget O ce (1991) conducted ex ante analyses of the anticipated
distributional e↵ects of OBRA90, while Congressional Budget O ce (1993) analyzed
OBRA93. Both reforms were overall tax increases for most taxpayers except for those at
the bottom of the distribution (see Tables H.2 and H.3).
EGTRRA01 & JGTRRA03: EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 were characterized by
reductions in marginal tax rates, both for low– and high–income families, expansions of
the child tax credits, and reductions in taxes on dividends. In 2003, JGTRRA accelerated
those provisions of EGTRRA which were not set to become e↵ective until 2006. Ex ante
analyses of the anticipated distributional e↵ects of both EGTRRA01 (Tax Policy Center,
2002; Joint Committee on Taxation, 2001) and JGTRRA03 (Tax Policy Center, 2003b,c)
show that both reforms were tax cuts and that the absolute dollar change in income tax
payments increases with each household income quintile (see Tables H.2 and H.3).
ATRA12: ATRA12 made the changes introduced with EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03
permanent with the exception of high-income taxpayers. For individuals with earnings in
excess of $400,000 ($450,000 for jointly filing married couples), the lowered rates expired
as scheduled and the previous marginal rate of 39.6% was brought back. Additionally,
these individuals saw an increase in the taxation of long-term capital gains and dividends,
with the rate raising from 15 to 20%. Tax Policy Center (2012k,l) conducted ex ante
analyses of the anticipated distributional e↵ects of ATRA12 assuming either current law
as baseline (i.e., temporary tax changes are considered to expire once finished) or current
policy as baseline (i.e., temporary tax changes are assumed to remain in place after they
expire) (see Tables H.2 and H.3). When using the current law baseline, the reform is a
tax cut for all taxpayers while it is an increase for the top of the distribution when using
current policy as the baseline. We refer to Saez (2016) for a detailed analysis ex post of
ATRA12.
TCJA17: TCJA17 made several significant changes to individual tax rates as well as
to the calculation of taxable income. Tax rates were reduced for all income brackets but
the lowest by one to four percentage points. The top rate was brought down from 39.6%
to 37%. Furthermore, both the standard deduction and the child tax credit were roughly
43
doubled. Joint Committee on Taxation (2017); Tax Policy Center (2018b,a) conducted
ex ante analyses of the anticipated distributional e↵ects (see Tables H.2 and H.3).
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I Extensions
In this section we show that the median voter theorem for small monotonic reforms (The-
orem 1) applies to models with more than one source of heterogeneity among individuals.
Again, we show that a small tax reform is preferred by a majority of taxpayers if and
only if it is preferred by the taxpayer with median income. Throughout, we stick to the
assumption that individuals di↵er in their productive abilities !. We introduce a second
consumption good and the possibility of heterogeneity in preferences over consumption
goods in Section I.1. We use this framework to discuss whether the introduction of dis-
tortionary taxes on savings is politically feasible. In Section I.2 we consider fixed costs
of labor market participation as an additional source of heterogeneity.6 In Section I.3 we
assume that individuals di↵er in their valuation of increased public spending.7 Finally,
in Section I.4, individuals di↵er by how much of their income is due to luck as in Alesina
and Angeletos (2005).
I.1 Political support for taxes on savings
We now suppose that there are two consumption goods. We refer to them as food and
savings, respectively. An individual’s budget constraint now reads as
cf + cs + T0s(cs) + ⌧shs(cs)  c0 + y   T0(y)  ⌧h(y) . (I.1)
The variables on the right-hand side of the budget constraint have been defined before.
On the left-hand side, cf denotes food consumption and cs savings. In the status quo
savings are taxed according to a possibly non-linear savings-tax function T0s. A reform
replaces both the status quo income tax schedule T0 by T1 = T0 + ⌧h and the status
quo savings tax schedule T0s by T1s = T0s + ⌧shs. We maintain the assumption that the
functions h and hs are non-decreasing and focus on revenue neutral reforms so that either
⌧ > 0 and ⌧s < 0 or ⌧ < 0 and ⌧s > 0.
Preferences of individuals are given by a utility function u(v(cf , cs,  ), y,!), where v is
a subutility function that assigns consumption utility to any consumption bundle (cf , cs).
The marginal rate of substitution between food and savings depends on a parameter  .
We do not assume a priori that   is the same for all individuals. Under this assumption,
however, the utility function u has the properties under which an e cient tax system does
not involve distortionary commodity taxes, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), or Laroque
(2005) for a more elementary proof. Distortionary taxes on savings are then undesirable
from a welfare-perspective.
Individuals choose cf , cs and y to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
above. We denote the utility maximizing choices by c⇤f (⌧s, ⌧,  ,!), c
⇤
s(⌧s, ⌧,  ,!) and
y⇤(⌧s, ⌧,  ,!) and the corresponding level of indirect utility by V (⌧s, ⌧,  ,!). The slope of
6See Saez (2002), Chone´ and Laroque (2011), and Jacquet et al. (2013).
7See Boadway and Keen (1993), Hellwig (2004), Bierbrauer (2014), or Weinzierl (2018).
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an indi↵erence curve in a ⌧ -⌧s diagram determines the individuals’ willingness to accept
higher savings taxes in return for lower taxes on current earnings. The following Lemma
provides a characterization of this marginal rate of substitution in a neighborhood of the
status quo. Let
s(⌧, ⌧ s,  ,!) =   V⌧ (⌧s, ⌧,  ,!)
V⌧s(⌧s, ⌧,  ,!)
be the slope of an individual’s indi↵erence curve in a ⌧ -⌧s diagram. The slope in the
status quo is denoted by s0(!,  ). We denote the individual’s food consumption, savings
and earnings in the status quo by c˜0f (!,  ), c˜
0
s(!,  ) and y˜
0(!,  ), respectively.
Lemma I.1 In the status quo the slope of a type (!,  )-individual’s indi↵erence curve in
a ⌧ -⌧s diagram is given by
s0(!,  ) =   h(y˜
0(!,  ))
hs(c˜0s(!,  ))
.
The Lemma provides a generalization of Roy’s identity that is useful for an analysis of
non-linear tax systems. As is well known, with linear tax systems, the marginal e↵ect
of, say, an increased savings tax on indirect utility is equal to   ⇤c⇤s(·), where  ⇤ is the
multiplier on the individual’s budget constraint, also referred to as the marginal utility
of income. Analogously, the increase of a linear income tax a↵ects indirect utility via
  ⇤y⇤(·) so that the slope of an indi↵erence curve in a ⌧s-⌧ -diagram would be equal
to the earnings-savings-ratio  y⇤(·)c⇤s(·) . Allowing for non-linear tax systems and non-linear
perturbations implies that the simple earnings-savings-ratio is replaced by   h(y⇤(·))hs(c⇤s(·)) .
Consider a reform that involves an increase in the savings tax rate d⌧s > 0 and a
reduction of taxes on income d⌧ < 0. We say that a type (!,  )-individual strictly prefers
a small reform with increased savings taxes over the status quo if
V⌧s(0, 0,  ,!) d⌧s + V⌧ (0, 0,  ,!) d⌧ > 0 ,
or, equivalently, if
d⌧s
d⌧
> s0(!,  ) =   h(y˜
0(!,  ))
hs(c˜0s(!,  ))
. (I.2)
Since hs is an increasing function, this condition is, ceteris paribus, easier to satisfy if the
individual has little savings in the status quo.8
8The ratio d⌧sd⌧ on the left-hand side of inequality (I.2) is determined as follow: Let R
s(⌧s, ⌧) be the
change of revenue from savings taxes and R(⌧s, ⌧) the change of revenue from income taxation due to
the reform. Revenue-neutrality requires that
Rs⌧s(⌧s, ⌧)d ⌧s +R
s
⌧ (⌧s, ⌧) d⌧ +R⌧s(⌧s, ⌧) d⌧s +R⌧ (⌧s, ⌧) d⌧ = 0 ,
or, equivalently, that
d⌧s
d⌧
=  R⌧ (⌧s, ⌧) +R
s
⌧ (⌧s, ⌧)
Rs⌧s(⌧s, ⌧) +R⌧s(⌧s, ⌧)
,
which has to be evaluated for (⌧s, ⌧) = (0, 0). We assume that this expression is well-defined and takes
a finite negative value.
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Di↵erent types will typically di↵er in their generalized earnings-savings-ratio s0(!,  )
and we can order types according to this one-dimensional index. Let (!,  )0M be the
type with the median value of s0(!,  ). The following proposition extends Theorem 1.
It asserts that a small reform is politically feasible if and only if it is supported by the
median type (!,  )0M .
Proposition I.1 For a given status quo tax policy and a given pair of non-decreasing
functions h and hs, the following statements are equivalent:
1. Type (!,  )0M prefers a small reform with increased savings taxes over the status
quo.
2. There is a majority of individuals who prefer a small reform with increased savings
taxes over the status quo.
As Theorem 1, Proposition I.1 exploits the observation that individuals can be ordered
according to a one-dimensional statistic that pins down whether or not they benefit
from a tax reform. This makes it possible to prove a median-voter theorem for reforms
that remain in a neighborhood of the status quo. There is also an important di↵erence
to Theorem 1. With only one-dimensional heterogeneity, there is a monotonic relation
between types and earnings so that the identity of the type with median income does not
depend on the status quo. Whatever the tax system, the person with the median income
is the person with the median type !M . Here, by contrast, we allow for heterogeneity
both in productive abilities and in preferences over consumption goods. The type with the
median value of the generalized earnings-savings-ratio s0(!,  ) will then typically depend
on the status quo tax system. This does not pose a problem if we focus on small reforms.
In this case, preferences over reforms follow from the generalized earnings-savings-ratios
in the status quo, and a small reform is preferred by a majority of individuals if and only
if it is preferred by the individual with the median ratio.
I.2 Fixed costs of labor market participation
With fixed costs of labor market participation individuals derive utility u(c ✓ 1y>0, y,!)
from a (c, y)-pair. Fixed costs ✓ absorb some of the individual’s after-tax income if the
individual becomes active on the labor market, e.g. because of additional child care
expenses. As before, there is an initial status quo tax schedule under which earnings are
transformed into after-tax income according to the schedule C0 with C0(y) = c0+y T0(y).
After a reform, the schedule is
C1(y) = c0 +R + y   T0(y)  ⌧ h(y) ,
where h is a non-decreasing function of y. We denote by y⇤(R, ⌧,!, ✓) the solution to
max
y
u(C1(y)  ✓ 1y>0, y,!),
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and the reform-induced change in indirect utility by V (R, ⌧,!, ✓). We proceed analogously
for other variables: what has been a function of ! in previous sections is now a function
of ! and ✓.
For a given function h, the marginal gain that is realized by an individual with type
(!, ✓) if the tax rate ⌧ is increased, is given by the following analogue to equation (2),
V⌧ (!, ✓ | ⌧, h) = u˜1c(!, ✓)
 
R⌧ (⌧, h)  h(y˜1(!, ✓))
 
, (I.3)
where u˜1c(!, ✓) is the marginal utility of consumption realized by a type (!, ✓)-individual
after the reform, and y˜1(!, ✓) are the individual’s post-reform earnings. At ⌧ = 0, we can
also write
V⌧ (!, ✓ | 0, h) = u˜0c(!, ✓)
 
R⌧ (0, h)  h(y˜0(!, ✓))
 
, (I.4)
where u˜0c(!, ✓) and y˜
0(!, ✓) are, respectively, marginal utility of consumption and earnings
in the status quo.
For a given status quo tax policy and a given function h we say that type (!, ✓) strictly
prefers a small tax reform over the status quo if V⌧ (!, ✓ | 0, h) > 0. The status quo median
voter strictly prefers a small reform if V⌧
 
(!, ✓)0M | 0, h  > 0, where y˜0M is the median
of the distribution of earnings in the status quo and (!, ✓)0M is the corresponding type;
i.e. y˜0
 
(!, ✓)0M
 
= y˜0M .
Proposition I.2 For a given status quo tax policy and a monotonic function h, the
following statements are equivalent:
1. Type (!, ✓)0M prefers a small reform over the status quo.
2. There is a majority of individuals who prefer a small reform over the status quo.
Proposition I.2 exploits that the slope of a type (!, ✓) individual’s indi↵erence curve
through a point (⌧, R),
s(⌧, R,!, ✓) = h(y⇤(R, ⌧,!, ✓)) .
is a function of the individual’s income. As in the basic Mirrleesian setup, the inter-
pretation is that individuals with a higher income are more di cult to convince that a
reform that involves tax increases (⌧ > 0) is worthwhile. A di↵erence to the Mirrleesian
setup is, however, that there is no monotonic relation between types and earnings. In
the presence of income e↵ects, and for a given level of !, y⇤ will increase in ✓ as long as
✓ is below a threshold ✓ˆ(!) and be equal to 0 for ✓ above the threshold. Moreover, the
threshold is a↵ected by tax policy. This implies that there is no longer a fixed type whose
income is equal to the median income whatever the tax schedule. As in Proposition I.1,
this does not pose a problem if we focus on small reforms, i.e. on small deviations from
(⌧, R) = (0, 0). In this case, preferences over reforms follow from the relation between
types and earnings in the status quo, and a small reform is preferred by a majority of
individuals if and only if it is preferred by the individual with the median level of income
in the status quo.
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I.3 Public-goods preferences
Suppose that the change in revenue R is used to increase or decrease spending on publicly
provided goods. The post-reform consumption schedule is then given by
C1(y) = c0 + y   T0(y)  ⌧ h(y) ,
We assume that individuals di↵er with respect to their public-goods preferences. Now
the parameter ✓ is a measure of an individual’s willingness to give up private goods con-
sumption in exchange for more public goods. More specifically, we assume that individual
utility is
u(✓(R0 +R) + C1(y), y,!) ,
where R0 is spending on publicly provided goods in the status quo. Again, we denote by
y⇤(R, ⌧,!, ✓) the solution to
max
y
u(✓(R0 +R) + C1(y), y,!)
and the reform-induced change in indirect utility by V (R, ⌧,!, ✓). By the envelope theo-
rem, the slope of a type (!, ✓) individual’s indi↵erence curve through point (⌧, R) is now
given by
s(⌧, R,!, ✓) =
h(y⇤(R, ⌧,!, ✓))
✓
.
This marginal rate of substitution gives the increase in public-goods provision that an
individual requires as a compensation for an increase of marginal tax rates. Ceteris
paribus, individuals with a lower income and individuals with a higher public-goods
preference require less of a compensation, i.e. they have a higher willingness to pay higher
taxes for increased public-goods provision. If we focus on small reforms we observe, again,
that if a type (!, ✓)-individual benefits from a small tax-increase, then the same is true
for any type (!0, ✓0) with
h(y˜0(!, ✓))
✓
  h(y˜
0(!0, ✓0))
✓0
.
By the arguments in the proof of Proposition I.2, a small reform with ⌧ > 0 is preferred
by a majority of individuals if and only if✓
h(y˜0(!, ✓))
✓
◆0M
< R⌧ (0, h) ,
where
⇣
h(y˜0(!,✓))
✓
⌘0M
is the median willingness to pay higher taxes for increased public
spending in the status quo.
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I.4 Fairness and politically feasible reforms
The validity of our approach does not dependent on the assumption that voting behavior
is driven by narrow self-interest. To illustrate this insight, we analyze politically feasible
reforms in the context of a model in which social preferences determine political support
for redistributive taxation. Specifically, we adopt the framework of Alesina and Angeletos
(2005). Alesina and Angeletos assume that individual incomes can be due to luck or e↵ort
and that preferences over tax policies include a motive to tax income that is due to luck
more heavily than income that is due to e↵ort. Alesina and Angeletos focus, however, on
linear tax systems.
There are two periods. When young individuals choose a level of human capital
k. When old individuals choose productive e↵ort or labor supply l. Pre-tax income is
determined by
y = ⇡(l, k) + ⌘ ,
where ⇡ is a production function that is increasing in both arguments and ⌘ is a random
source of income, also referred to as luck. An individual’s life-time utility is written as
u(c, l, k,!). Utility is increasing in the first argument. It is decreasing in the second and
third argument to capture the e↵ort costs of labor supply and human capital investments,
respectively. E↵ort costs are decreasing in !. More formally, lower types have steeper
indi↵erence curves both in a (c, l)-space and in a (c, k)-space. We consider reforms that
lead to a consumption schedule
C1(y) = c0 +R + y   T0(y)  ⌧ h(y) .
We assume that individuals first observe how lucky they are and then choose how hard
they work, i.e. given a realization of ⌘ and given the predetermined level of k, individuals
choose l so as to maximize
u(C1(⇡(l, k) + ⌘), l, k,!) .
We denote the solution to this problem by l⇤(R, ⌧,!, ⌘, k). The reform-induced change
in indirect utility is denoted by V (R, ⌧,!, ⌘, k). As of t = 1, there is multi-dimensional
heterogeneity among individuals: they di↵er in their type !, in their realization of luck
⌘ and possibly also in their human capital k.
In Alesina and Angeletos (2005) preferences over reforms have a selfish and fairness
component. The indirect utility function V shapes the individuals’ selfish preferences over
reforms. The analysis of these selfish preferences can proceed along similar lines as the
extension that considered fixed costs of labor market participation. Selfish preferences
over small reforms follow from the relation between types and earnings in the status
quo, and a small reform makes a majority better o↵ if and only if it is beneficial for
the individual with the median level of income in the status quo. More formally, let
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y˜0(!, ⌘, k) := y⇤(0, 0,!, ⌘, k) be a shorthand for the earnings of a type (!, ⌘, k)-individual
in the status quo and recall that the sign of
s(0, 0,!, ⌘, k) = h(y˜0(!, ⌘, k))
determines whether an individual benefits from a small tax reform. Specifically, suppose
that h is a non-decreasing function and denote by y0M the median level of income in
the status quo and by (!, ⌘, k)0M the corresponding type. A majority of individuals is
– according to their selfish preferences – made better o↵ if and only if the median voter
benefits from the reform,
s0
 
(!, ⌘, k)0M
 
= h
 
y˜0M
 
< R⌧ (0, h) .
In their formalization of social preferences, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) view ⇡(l, k)
as a reference income. It is the part of income that is due to e↵ort as opposed to luck. A
tax reform a↵ects the share of y = ⇡(l, k) + ⌘ that individuals can keep for themselves.
After the reform, the di↵erence between disposable income and the reference income is
given by9
C1(y)  ⇡(l, k) = ⌘   T0(⇡(l, k) + ⌘)  ⌧h(⇡(l, k) + ⌘) .
A social preferences for fair taxes is then equated with a desire to minimize the variance
of ⌘   T0(⇡(l, k) + ⌘)   ⌧h(⇡(l, k) + ⌘) taking into account that k and l are endogenous
variables.10 Denote this variance henceforth by ⌃(R, ⌧). Any one individual is assumed
to evaluate a tax reform according to
V (R, ⌧,!, ⌘, k)  ⇢ ⌃(R, ⌧) ,
where ⇢ is the weight on fairness considerations which is assumed to be the same for
all individuals. Therefore, heterogeneity in preferences over reforms is entirely due to
heterogeneity in selfish preferences. Consequently, the finding that a small reform is
preferred by a majority of taxpayers if and only if it is preferred by the voter with
median income in the status quo is not a↵ected by the inclusion of a demand for fair
taxes.
9The analysis in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) looks at a special case of this. They focus on a status
quo equal to the laissez-faire schedule so that T0(y) = 0, for all y, and a reform that introduces a linear tax
schedule, i.e. h(y) = y, for all y. Under these assumptions, we have ⌘ T0(⇡(l, k)+⌘) ⌧h(⇡(l, k)+⌘) =
(1  ⌧)⌘ + ⌧⇡(l, k) .
10Human capital investment is a function of e↵ort costs ! and the expectations (Re, ⌧e) of the young
on the tax reforms that will be adopted when they are old.
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